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Abstract

In this paper I will argue that sortition - choosing representatives by chance - could be a way of
conciliating the disenchanted democratic citizens with their government. Current democracies suffer
under what has been termed the democratic fatigue syndrome. Low voter turnouts, decreasing citizen
participation, high rates of distrust and a subsequent rise of nationalist movements. But underlying this
fatigue seems to be a general systematic problem, which Robert J. Pranger, Hannah Arendt and Max
Weber identify as the politics of interests. These politics rely on competition, coalitions and assertive
creativity, - en grow - they rely on power and power play.
These politics of interests are closely related with the method of choosing representatives via
elections. Elections congeal diversity of political interests and opinion into one campaign theme.
Throughout the development of the republican tradition elections became a more popular mode of
finding representatives, largely due to the rational hierarchy inherent in elections. This natural
hierarchy also assumes a natural distinction between politician and voter and has in the long run caused
the current problem of interest based politics and a disenchanted citizenry.
In the American context, the founding fathers did not envision a purely interest based polity.
Rater the polity should be full of liberty, balancing private ambition with toleration and thereby
creating community. Because, however, the federal government has increasingly become subject to
elected officials, interests have obscured the public good of toleration. Today, the factious tendencies of
the federal government seem stronger than ever, creating vicious groups of membership with us against
them mindsets. The original idea of union in the American community has fallen silent.
Sortition, qua its characters of freedom and equality and its necessary plurality could work to
recreate such community. I will attempt to relate sortition to Robert J. Pranger’s ideas of liberty and
Hannah Arendt’s conception of the founding moment of the US Constitution.

Preface
With the publication of his book, Against Elections - The Case for Democracy, David Van Reybrouck,
speaks to a certain aspect of traditional republican thinking that had been lost over the years, namely,
the fact that elections are not the only method to delegate representatives. There is, in fact, another
method to select state officials, which was celebrated in early republics. This method was appointment
by lot. The process of which, we will call “sortition.”1
In Ancient Athens, Ancient Rome, and in a number of medieval and Renaissance city states,
some, or a significant amount, of the political administration was delegated to representatives chosen by
lot. What might seem today like a strange way of choosing representatives appears to have been
perfectly normal—at least in Ancient Athens during the Age of Demosthenes. Through sortition the
average citizen was usually more involved in a deliberative fashion, since lot discriminatory than the
method of election.
Exploring the use of lot in the political context has been a very surprising journey to me.
Initially, I was under the impression that only a small circle of academics had given any thought to the
use of lot in Ancient Greece. I have since learned that political scientists, like Bernard Manin, have
minutely drawn out its history up to the present day;2 that popular authors, like Reybrouck, have sold
books on the topic outside academic circles; that academics and activists, like James Fiskin, have
implemented deliberative, randomly chosen, citizen bodies;3 that institutions, like the European Union,
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have made use of sortition in policy questions;4 and that countries like Canada have brought citizens
and politicians together, who were randomly chosen, to work on a constitutional amendment.5
What I thought to be a niche intuition that I had gotten from my good friend, Luke Harrington,
has turned out to be a serious political question today. Strange, neither he nor I had encountered it
earlier in our respective studies of history and political science. Or maybe not strange, but rather
indicative of the unorthodox approach of sortition: to choose representatives by lot, to choose
representatives randomly, right out of the population.
Indeed, to choose representatives randomly seems counterintuitive to the political processes we
are accustomed to. We see a politician, as “a person who is professionally involved in politics, especially
as a holder of an elected office.”6 We may very well not want a body of randomly chosen citizen to
make decisions on our behalf; we believe that would be unjustified. We cannot consent to the rule of
someone who has been chosen at random in the same way as we consent to the power of politicians we
elect. Furthermore, may we think that politicians in fact need to be professionals that deal with highly
complicated policy questions on a daily basis. They are educated and talented in a way that the
ordinary citizen is not, which is precisely the reason why they are distinguished and precisely the reason
we vote for them.
This distinction Bernard Manin terms the principle of distinction. 7 A principle inherent in the
elective method that makes us choose a representative that is distinguished from us. The distinction
between us and the person we chose to give our vote to depends very much on our act of choice.
Whom do we deem worthy of our vote. We are free to choose whichever candidate we deem best, and
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that is the politically our freedom. Sortition, however, does not allow us any such freedom of choice. We
don’t get to vote and we don’t get to choose. Instead, sortition is based entirely on chance.
Why then, did the people of Ancient Athens use sortition? Or why has the idea of using
sortition found recent revival? And of course also: why has the concept of sortition lost to the concept
of elections over time?
The reason why the Ancients used sortition and the reason why it has resurfaced recently, is
because it offers a different approach to representative democracy, than elections. In terms of specific
policy questions, sortition has, somehow, allowed for a closer relationship between the policy question
and the citizenry.
One interesting example in which a randomly selected body of citizens was convened was the
Irish constitutional debate around gay rights. The Irish Constitutional Convention (ICC), born out of
the economic crisis of 2008-09, comprised 100 members of which two-thirds were randomly8 chosen
citizens. The other third were politicians.9 Together, they deliberated on the question whether gay rights
should be amended into the constitution of Ireland. To answer this question the deliberative body was
supplied with information. First, by hearing different “expert” opinions; second, by discussing those. As
the Washington Post wrote: “Constitutional lawyers and child psychologists, who had provided briefing
documents in advance, made brief presentations…“ But not only „elites“ supplied information but also
advocates were given a chance to present their opinion, “including a Catholic bishop, adult children of
same-sex couples and a gay opponent of marriage equality.”10 The ICC also considered a significant
amount of questions presented via social media. “After a weekend of deliberation and debate, the
members voted on the matter in secret, as was the ICC practice. A full 79 percent voted in favor of

8

Demographically fair representation was applied.

9
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recommending that marriage equality be put on the ballot.”11 In late May 2015, Ireland introduced
marriage equality into its constitution. Many interest groups claimed credit for that success, however, as
the Washington Post wrote: “deliberation produced a real-world constitutional change, the first time
that that has happened – showing this method really can matter.”12
What characterizes a deliberative body is that its members are chosen out of a specific
population, for a specific task, for a specific time. The body is usually comprised of 200 too 400 people
that are a “representative sample” of the population.13 The people chosen are asked to deliberate on a
certain topic. Participants will receive balanced information in the form of written material and “expert
presentations,” as it was done Ireland. Ireland also shows that if the topic is of concern to the broader
population, then some part of the deliberative process is often televised. Televising gives the population
the opportunity to participate in the process by questioning and observing.
James S. Fishkin from the University of Stanford is a the proponent and maybe the founder of
the idea he trademarked, “deliberative polling.” He started the method of deliberative polling in the
presidential elections of 1988, suggesting in an article in the Atlantic that a random body of citizens
would better reflect what the general population thought about the different Democratic and
Republican electoral candidates than conventional poling data. Instead of just obtaining individual
opinions on each candidate with traditional polls, the new process enabled Fishkin to observe how public
opinion manifests. As quoted by Reybrouck, Fishkin wrote: “These [traditional] polls model what the
public is thinking when it is not thinking… A deliberative poll models what the public would think if it
had a better chance to think about issues.”14 Fishkin proposed convening a random body of citizens to
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deliberate on each and every potential nominee. Such deliberation would subsequently be broadcast
and the opinions be recorded.
Fishkin did not manage to create a deliberative poll in 1988, he did, however, in 1996, in Austin
Texas, which was broadcast by PBS.15 The results were “striking” as Reybrouck writes: “The
consultation process had made the citizens significantly more competent and more sophisticated in their
political judgments as they had learned to adjust their opinion and had become more aware of the
complexity of political decision-making.”16 Until today deliberative polls have been used in more than
24 countries, often dealing with controversial issues that have stalled in the ordinary political
processes.17
In 2012, Lawrence Lessing and Roy L. Furman proposed that the Senate Judiciary Committee
use a deliberative body on the topic of “Taking Back Our Democracy: Responding To Citizen United
And The Rise of Super PACs.” The deliberative body would “produce a mature and stable view about
the issues presented,” and “face the extraordinary lack of confidence that Americans have in their
government.” 18
In 2010, a deliberative poll was held in Michigan with 300 randomly chosen citizens,
representative of Michigan’s demography, who deliberated on questions of unemployment, education
and taxation.19 After deliberation, 45% voted for an increase in income tax, up from 27% percent prior
to deliberation.20 The preference to decrease business tax went from 40% to 67%, and the “making
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Michigan a greener economy” proposal from 55% to 67% approval rating.21 The factual based
knowledge index overall increased 7.7%.22 This last increase by 7.7% is interesting. It shows that that
actual knowledge barely increased, while all other data significantly shifted.23 This may suggest that it is
not so much the increase in information that causes people to change their mind, but rather the chance
to deliberate itself.
Deliberative polls seem to have an educative effect on those participating. These polls allow for
the creation of a space to think. At a time when the people have very little trust in their politicians,
Deliberative Polls may prove effective in reinstating confidence in the political process and effective in
bring people and politicians together.
This lack of confidence that, not only, Americans, but also many citizens of other western
governments experience, is the reason Reybrouck cites for the resurfacing of lot, and the idea of
deliberative democracy. What Laskin et al. called a lack of confidence; Reybrouck calls “the
Democratic Fatigue syndrome.”24 The idea, or rather the observation, is that the people find themselves
increasingly alienated from their politicians. This is shown in decreasing voter turnouts, decreasing
citizen participation, high rates of distrust, and a subsequent rise of nationalist movements.25 Or as
Reybrouck wrote:
…anyone who puts together low voter turnout, high voter turnover, declining party
membership, governmental impotence, political paralysis, electoral fear of failure, lack of
recruitment, compulsive self-promotion, chronic electoral fever, exhausting media stress,
distrust, indifference and other persistent paroxysms sees the outlines of a syndrome
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emerging. Democratic Fatigue Syndrome is a disorder that has not yet been fully described
but from which countless Western societies are nonetheless unmistakably suffering. 26
Based on the factors that Reybrouck lists, and as the meaning of fatigue suggests, the people have
started to “opt out” of the political process. This lack of participation has led to distrust and a lack of
confidence. Or, as Josine Blok wrote: “A major cause for the observed decline in commitment and trust,
as many political analysts agree, is a lack of citizens’ active participation.”27 She goes on to say:
“According to one school of thought, however, this absence is not a failure of the system or a historical
coincidence, but the corollary of the principle of representation underlying modern democracies (that
is since the late eighteenth century).”28 She explains that “in such a political system, citizens transfer
their individual share in sovereignty to their representatives by the act of voting, and the resulting
distance between representatives (who act) and represented (who vote) is an intentional, necessary
feature of the system.”29 The voting system has the effect of outsourcing the ability to act from the
voter to the representative. The voter, then alienated from the ability to act politically, will feel alienated
from the political process itself. The principle of distinction, therefore, not only has the effect of
distinguishing between those that vote and those that are voted for, but also distinguishes between those
that act and those that do not act. Today, on might say that this distinction disenchants the general
citizen with the political process. In an inverted sense, we might be compelled to say that over time
elections have shown their most deeply rooted characteristic: the principle of distinction30 between
elected and electors.
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I take this wording from Bernard Manin who uses this characteristic – the principle of distinction – to explain the
underlying principle of the method of elections and how it came about historically. “Another inegalitarian characteristic of
representative government, however, was deliberately introduced after extensive discussion, namely that the representatives
be socially superior to those who elect them.” Manin, The Principles, 94.
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A proposed remedy to this alienation may be the method of lot, which does not make use of the
principle of distinction. Today, a striking number of countries have a platform for deliberative
democracy. Many of them have used it for a directly related government function, such as finding
consensus regarding an amendment to the constitution.31 But the movement has gone even further,
from simply advocating certain policies, to the suggestion by Terril G. Bouricious to replace the current
legislative branch of the US government with six different bodies, all chosen by lot.32
In the subsequent chapter, I compare the method of lot and the method of election. The case
par excellence for the method of lot is classical Athens. After exploring how lot worked in Ancient Athens
I follow its historical discussion in writings by Aristotle, Montesquieu, Rousseau, the Federalists, and the
Anti-Federalists. These writings illustrate that the method of lot increasingly looses to the method of
elections.
Rather than focusing on the results lot causes in deliberative bodies, I want to focus on the
qualities it brings out in the citizen. I am thus not so much looking for outcome of better informed
decisions, but the ability to make decisions itself. I will not deal in this paper with the question of how
deliberative bodies were given information and what they were presented with, or whether the
deliberative process is manipulative or informative, or both. Instead I will focus on the qualities
associated with the politics of elections and sortition. Or, in other words, instead of focusing on recent
works in political science, like discussing Bouricious’ design mentioned above, I focus on the history of
theory regarding the respective methods of lot and election for why the method of elections was
preferred to the method of lot.

31

See the following articles:
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I will argue that the increasing preference for election as opposed to lot amplifies the principle of
distinction between those that govern and those that are governed. The distinction between those that
govern and those that are governed derives, not, out of a necessity to allocate certain administrative
posts, but out of the elective method itself. This implies that political freedom to act is only given to
those that are distinguished. Lot, on the contrary, makes no use of the principle of distinction, still, in
modern republics there are only a certain number of political positions available. Hannah Arendt will
take this problem up, however, not with reference to sortition. It will therefore be worthwhile to try
sortition in Arendt’s politics writings and see whether it would, as she accused elections, corrupt political
freedom.
I will argue that sortition does not disenchant the citizen from those that govern, but rather
educates both on matters of the citizen as well as on matters of the public. Sortition has the effect of
bringing the unexpected, individual knowledge base of the individual citizen to the public. This
certainly begs the question what we expect from the individual citizen that has been drawn at random.
Nothing but their opinion. Drawing on Arendt, the bodies of government where political opinion is
produced, are those where lot should be applied.
In short, I hope that, however strange we might find the method of lot, we will also understand
why the people of Ancient Athens thought its use worthwhile. And that that there may be reasons to
consider institutionalizing popular government within the checks and balances of a federal republic,
even if doing so only adds one more source of power to the political landscape; following
Montesquieu’s insight that the more sources of power a government has, the freer will be it’s citizens.
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Introduction

The modern nation state suffers under democratic fatigue. Characteristic of this fatigue is
decreasing citizen participation, low voter turnouts and increasing frustration with the elected
representatives and politics in general. People are reluctant to participate in elections, especially on a
local level, and on a federal level do not think their votes count as much, which, in the case of United
States, is not untrue, if one lives in a predominantly blue or red state. As has been shown in the preface,
this political fatigue may be caused by a distinction between those that can act politically and those that
cannot not. In representative democracies it are usually the representatives that act politically and the
represented that do not, or only do so on election day.
Looking at the American political landscape there may be, however, another symptom at work,
beside political fatigue. In fact, following the bi-partisan divide, neither side seems especially fatigued.
Rather the struggle of these factions appears to be stronger and ever more demanding. Those that are
politically active, seem to be more active then ever, handing out petitions, creating clear distinctions of
membership, repeating their political views and interests on any and every occasion. Shootings become
a place for the anti-gun lobby, crime a place for those that “support guns,” “our troops” are supported
by either side. Social media is full of little two minute commercials on what views to hold on what and
the political Op-Ed usually more in search of increasing membership to the authors political siding,
than the expression of a puzzled, or unique personal opinion.
On the one hand, political science indicates a decline in citizen participation in politics overall.
On the other hand, those that are active in politics, let them be citizens or politicians, seem more
engaged then ever. This engagement, however follows clear lines of us vs. them, an antagonism that
may have caused the less passionate to fatigue.

1

On face value it seems that only those that have a clear political interest, nowadays, are
participating in politics and that these participants are adamant about their interest. But if it is only
those that have a clear political interest that are politically active, that means in turn, that all politics,
nowadays, seem to be based on interests.
The focus on political interests makes sense considering how in a representative democracy
interest become political via elections. In order to win an election one needs votes. Any political interest,
or any person with a political interest, therefore is in need of persuading others of the importance of
this interest. Only if a majority of people support this interest, their representative will come into
power, that is office. That means, that politically interests become stronger, the more people support
them, or, to turn the phrase around, the more aggregate the political interest the stronger its power,
which is why those people, that are active in politics, are so eager to expand membership to their cause.
The elective system demands that interests exist in a aggregate state. Aggregation means that
these interests need to be homogenized to speak to as many people at once without speaking to them
less then the opposing narrative of the opposition party. What is of political interest for some locality,
also needs to be made politically interesting for another locality, so as to summon their votes.

T h e

need for a broad narrative to reach a broad spectrum of voters stands in contradiction to the specific
political experience of the individual voter. To reach resonance in the political experience of most will
lower the chances of reaching full resonance with any. Therefore the speech involved in politics of
interests is usually not one of individual experience or diversity, but one of homogeneity and powerplay.
Political speeches serve to reify allegiance by relying on predetermined symbols the members
know by heart, while at the same time repeating membership by scapegoating those that are of the
other team. There is no community of all. There are those that are politically active and those that are
not active. And even those that are active shut themselves of into competitive and aggressive interest
2

groups. Such competitive mentality may be another reason why some have fatigued of the
representative democratic process. The projection of difference in this competition is constructed
through narratives of morality, through the rhetoric of winning and loosing, through strategy and
allegiance of minority parties against other minority or majority parties. The minority is loosing to the
interest of the majority, forcing everyone to live under that interest. In turn minority parties form
allegiances to achieve majority, thereby dealing away with the locality of their interests so as to increase
membership, which may, in the extreme, cause citizens even to vote against their own interest. Even
worse it can cause them to vote against their own interests but falsify the effect of voting by replacing
interests of different localities, allowing citizens to choose along the lines of policy that will not affect
them.
But voting for someone who fights for one’s interest, or voting for a party who’s political vision
one finds interesting is the way in which representative democracy operates. The citizens make their
views known through voting, and the voting system homogenizes their views into aggregate, preferably
majority positions. This is a dilemma because it has split the citizenry between those that are animated
by the system of interests and those that are fatigued by it. It has split the in a sense the community that
is supposed to be made of the people of the nation. Or, in other words, the elective system seems to
speak to only those with clear political interests within party politics, and in turn gives them a voice, but
those that have a more diverse political experience outside of this elective system are left out of the
politics en gross.
One may respond that being left out by this system is their own fault, politics is about power,
and all they have to do is organize to make themselves heard. But organizing to make themselves heard
would immediately recreate the structure of elective politics and again silence the individual voice. The
dilemma therefore seems to lie within the system of elections, which only gives voice to interests not

3

community. Which begs the question whether there is any other way of choosing representatives in the
republican tradition, that could “represent” those that are left out by elections?
Sortition would be another way of choosing representatives that would give voice to the diverse
and individual experience of the citizen. Sortition is the method of choosing representatives by lot, that
is by chance. Not relying on the hierarchical structure of elections, sortition has no need to homogenize
the individual political experience into an aggregate state of political interest. Rather, it allows the
temporary elevation of the individual to a public persona, so as to allow this individual to try themselves
as political being and so that the public may hear diverse and personal experiences of the citizens
chosen and thereby experience community. Or, in other words: Introducing sortition besides elections
would diversify political opinion and complicate the competition of political interests and in turn create
something like tolerance for the diversity of the members of the American community.
Ancient Athens is the case par excellence to understand how sortition worked in an political
environment.

4

Chapter I

While modern American government relies heavily on elections, the Athenian approach relied
on a process of sortition. Randomly selected citizens would serve in a given public office, in an effort to
represent the cities population on administrative or juristic tasks. Random selection was not influenced
by skill, party alliance, public promise, or the consent of the voter. Instead, the only prerequisite was to
be part of the community of citizens. And the selection for office was truly based on chance, which
speaks to the trust the Athenians had in this community. Being chosen by chance allowed for the
temporary elevation of the individual to a public persona, but the individual still was part of the
community. From the perspective of a modern reader one may ask: How could this system operate?
And how can this process of sortition be considered democratic?
The historical development of democracy in Ancient Athens complicates how sortition was
considered democratic. Sortition was a way of allocating individuals to offices within a specific political
institution— but it was the power of this institutional body that made sortition politically significant.
Since the relationships between political bodies changed frequently, the power of sortition within the
democracy did as well. Therefore it is in order to look at sortition in the time frame after the
development of democracy.
In order to locate the beginning of democracy it is necessary to define what democracy is. One
definition, following Josia Ober, is “demokratia is the celebration by the demos of a way of life centered
on the freedom of the citizen and political equality.”33 Ober understands democracy as deriving, not
sufficiently but at least substantially, from the identity of a citizen as “demos,” and the subsequent will
of this demos to be a politically active entity.34 According to Ober the way the demos participated

33
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politically was characterized by freedom and equality, in the sense that the citizen was equal in his
potential of influencing policy, and free in the sense of having the power to do so.3536
A unified demos was first experienced by the political elite in the events of 508/7 B.C. and thus
marks, for Ober, the beginning of Democracy. Ober argues, that expelling the Spartan King with 300
Warriors, and his Athenian Allies, was the first time in Greek history that "demos” acted unified on the
conception of itself being an Athenian political force.37 “It”, the demos , then nullified the expulsion via
ostracism of Cleisthenes and his followers, who became, or maybe already was, the elite advocate for
democracy.38 Therefore democracy was born out of the sudden emancipation of the demos, acting
politically (expelling the foreigners and their allies) and thus gaining krate (power).
Daniela Cammack takes up the two intriguing aspects of this narrative, namely the demos, as
being referred to as a single entity, (“it” in English) and - responding to what puzzled Ober -the absence
of a leader figure in the uprising of the demos in 508/7 B.C.39 She explains that throughout Ancient
Greek texts the demos is referred to as either a singular collective agent, an independent political agent,
or partial agents.40 Cammack thus wonders what “demos” meant, if “it" acted in singular verb forms, if
“it” had political agency, or if “it” often excluded the elite. She concludes that demos signified a
corporation, in the sense of signifying an Assembly of lower class citizens. Democracy then simply meant
that the Assembly received power, that is, - the demos received krate.41

35
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Daniela Cammack agrees with Ober that the events of 508/7 marked the beginning of
democracy, not because of a sudden emancipation of the lower class under a collective identity, but
because of a shift in power towards the Assembly. She writes:
Cleisthenes, were are told, ‘took the demos into his hetaireia’ (perhaps best translated
‘fraternity’) and ‘drew the demos to his side’, thus gaining the advantage over his rival
Isagoras (a Athenian ally of Sparta). … I would alter Ober’s wording. What Herodotus
tells us is not that it was in the Assembly that Cleisthenes allied himself to the demos, but
simply that Cleisthenes allied himself to the demos, i.e. to the Assembly - and thence, by
extension, to the common people at large.42
The birth of democracy, therefore, simply describes the political center of gravity shifting from a small
Council of elites towards the larger crowd in the Assembly. This shift may presuppose a democratic
identity, or an emancipation of the demos. But it was not the sudden creation of identity that brought
about democracy, but rather the literal transfer of making a decision concerning the Spartan invasion
not with the elites, but with the demos. With the demos becoming at once both the source of power and
the crowd of peers, another wording for democracy may have been simply that the community gained
power.43
This singular moment which describes the beginning of democracy also defines it, but it does
not necessarily explain its duration.44 For democracy to continue the demos would have to be involved
in almost all decisions of Greek politics. This could only be done if the principles of the Assembly,
which later became the principles of democracy, extended to all other political offices. In other words,
the principles of democracy, as the celebration of equality and freedom, had to continue also in the
administration of the state and remain with the community, the demos. Only one way of allocating
political offices allowed for these principles to continue, and that was sortition.
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Sortition allowed for the principles of the assembly, equality and freedom, to extend into
different “institutions” that had a share in the administration of Ancient Athens. As sortition is central
to understanding democracy, it is important to ask who specifically had access to these institutions and
in what manner political business within these institutions was administered.45 Or, more simply put,
who decided what, when was it decided, and where?
In his essay, On the Election by Lot, James Wycliff Headlam notes how “…a Greek had no doubt
what he meant by a democracy; it was a city in which the people gathered together at a definite place in
one large visible Assembly governed the state.”46 Contrary to how we perceive democracy today, as
abstract and removed, in ancient Greece it was a tangible experience. Ten times a year meetings in the
Ekklesia took place, including some 4000 to 8000 citizens. Citizens met in a central space of a town,
situated on top of a hill, widely visible from the city down below and open to all those who were
eligible. Likewise, the exercise of power was an actual experience. “The demos to an Athenian was a
concrete thing which he had often seen and heard: it was the εκκλησια.“47 This wording may be a little
confusing, because Eκκλησια simply signified the positive political aspect of the demos, that in itself
described a mass meeting.48 Eκκλησια translates to those summoned from, or called out of, „typically
following a formal call-out (ekkaleô, ‘call out’ or ‚summon’).”49 Today we translate Eκκλησια to “church,”
which is telling, for it helps us to understand the social significance of the meeting. Like going to church,
going to the Ekklesia was a community - and therefore a political event.

Since these institutions developed over time I will limit my scope of inquiry to the time of Aristotle and his exact
contemporary Demosthenes (384-322). In order to understand how these institutions worked I will follow both the wording
used by contemporaries to describe the political processes and the relationships of the institutions towards each other. This
approach allows for both nominal and historic arguments respectively.
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Becoming a citizen and appearing in public at the Ekklesia was a political process that affirmed
as much positively as negatively who belonged to the Athenian community. Each male person over the
age of twenty could sit in the Assembly if they were registered in their respective districts (demes), had
completed their introduction to the military, and did not have a record of any criminal activity. The
districts were combined into ten tribes (prytany), and in each district a father would introduced their son
to citizenship by asking their fellow citizens of that district to vote on whether they believed that their
son was a true Athenian.50 The initiation of becoming a citizen, therefore, was in Ancient Athens
already a political moment that involved the judgment of neighbors. The trust that Athenians exercised
through sortition, therefore, was not blind. It occurred after an communal initiation, one in which an
small scale, electoral process took place.
The prerequisites for becoming an Athenian citizen changed over time. The overall tendency,
however, was to base citizenship on ancestry and social standing. Women, slaves, those who had been
convicted of a crime, and those who refused military service, were all excluded from becoming true
citizens. At one point, both parents of a given candidate needed to be Athenian citizens, a prerequisite
which sought to keep the merchant elites from overpopulating the public arena. Thus, as Ober suggests,
the citizenry had a strong identity.
Within this political space, sortition was a way to extend the principles of the assembly, equality
and freedom, into different parts of government. Athenians used voting to measure the popularity of
policy proposals or judicial decisions, not to allocate representatives. It was common procedure in the
Council, as well as in the General Assembly or the Courts, to vote as a simple way of reaching a
commonly supported decision.51 The people making a decision, however, had been allocated randomly
by the method of sortition. The device used to randomly select citizens was called Kleroterion. The
Kleroterion was a machine built of stone and wood, in which different colored marbles would randomly
50Ibid.,
51
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fall on a given citizens token. In order to participate, citizens had to meet varying age requirements.
Participation in this roulette was voluntary, or in the Greek, - ho boulemous, all those wishing. This process
took place in the Ekklesia, a form of demos in itself (following Cammack’s insight from above). To leave
political power to those wishing and randomly chosen stands testament to the trust Athenians must
have had in their community. Community was build through this trust, rather than the common process
of choosing representatives through voting.
By the Age of Demosthenes, specifically between 384-22 B.C., the institutional landscape of
Athenian political life consisted of four distinct bodies: the Popular Assembly (ekklesia), the Magistracies
(archai), the Council (boule), and the Courts (dikasteria).52 Except for the popular Assembly, all other
institutions used randomly selected representatives either exclusively or alongside the method of
elections.53 The council, the courts, and the magistrate were randomly selected from a volunteering
population. Only a few magistracies were allocated by elections, mostly for positions that demanded
high expertise.54 While the Assembly and Courts relied on large crowds, the Council and Magistrates
actively used sortition to reflect the community.55
The General Assembly in Ekklesia decided on questions of policy, publicity, and public
administration.56 It also evaluated the performance of all those that had received a particular task by
the community. Usually orators would present the policy in question and the assembled citizens would
subsequently vote, so that “the demos” made his will known.57 This process of listening and deciding
was expressed by the word bouleuomai and it signified not merely “thinking” but also always “coming to a
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decision that was within the institutions or groups power.”58 It did not mean deliberating in the sense
that all participants spoke or discussed, but rather bouleuomai meant “decision making,”59 which is makes
sense given the large number of participants. On account if its size, the Assembly could not efficiently
deal with the day-to-day task that came about in managing the state. Thus some administrative power
was delegated to a Council of 400 citizens, and later after Solon it was 500 citizens, and 700
magistrates.60 Six hundred out of these seven hundred magistrates and the whole Council were chosen
by sortition.61 Thus, the process of sortition was a way of delegating administrative tasks. Most of the
power around decision making, however, was centered in the general assembly.62
The purpose of the Council was to provide structure to the General Assembly, without
overbearing its political power.63 The Council prepared the Agenda for the General Assembly and
executed its decrees.64 In preparing the agenda the Council had the ability to control what would
become and not become a political issue for the demos. Historically, the function of the counsel rose out
of the intra-elite competition in order to extert control over the decrees of the General Assembly by
setting the agenda.65 However, at the time of Demosthenes the Council was open to all citizens
regardless of property qualification. Therefore it cannot be said that the elite controlled the agenda of
the General Assembly.66
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Additionally, the vetting process which councilmen and magistrates underwent did not conserve
elitism but rather raised awareness of their community. This vetting process, dokimasia, assessed whether
a given candidate paid taxes and what their relationship was to their parents.67 This examination was,
however, a mere formality. It in no way indented to weed out incompetence, as might be assumed.68
The requirement to pay taxes did not systematically exclude any volunteering candidate. Instead, it was
a public event that made the potential candidate again aware of his community and those that vetted
him for the special task of administration.
As the Councilmen presided over the General Assembly by executing probouleutic tasks, so did
the magistrates preside over the courts.69 The magistrates, like the councilors, had to meet the age
requirement of 30 years old. Out of the 700 magistrates, 600 were chosen by the process of sortition.
The other one hundred were chosen by vote.70 Similar to the councilmen, all the magistrates were more
administrators than rulers.71 They called meetings, prepared business, and presided over and put
motions to vote. Thus they channeled the citizen’s motion to the a decisive authority.
Like the councilmen the magistrates rarely decided but rather advised the citizenry. The
vocabulary used to describe the political power of both councilors and magistrates speaks to this fact.
The word commonly used for the “deliberative process” in the Council was “bouleuô, ‘plan’ or, as noted
above, ‘perform Council activity’, and probouleuô, ‘pre-plan’…”, only rarely bouleuomai.72 Cammack
considers the numerous mentions of “planing” as proof that the Council did in fact not decide on
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certain issues. The Council and Magistrates, rather devised plans to address these issues or anticipate
them. The decisive power still lay with the Assembly.
It is worthwhile to spend some time on the question of finance and expertise, because it has
been a point of contestation how popular government in Ancient Athens secured monetary
administration.73 Some post concerning financial administration were filled by citizens of the higher
rank of society through property qualifications and subsequent voting. Other posts could be created by
the expert himself, if he persuaded the Assembly of its necessity and adequacy. Still, no law or decision
could be made without the concurrence of the General Assembly, in which the matter had to be
discussed.74 Most financial questions therefore, were answered by the aid of orators in the General
Assembly.
It was the role of the experts to be orators that took to advising the citizenry.75 The orators were
considered the political elite in certain respects. Manin describes how “…the practice (in Ancient
Athens) was to speak of orators and generals (rhetoric kai strategoi) in the same breath.”76 Considering
orators and generals as an natural duo suggests that they were considered to belong to the same group
of “political leaders.” However, as Manin further suggest, the fact that they were banned to the
“outskirts” of the political process hints at the limits of their power. The orators inhabited roles that
were merely advisory, speaking to the deep distrust the Athenians felt toward the elite.77
Cases of distrust toward Councilmen, Orators or Magistrates were solved by the Courts and
thereby again by the community. The Courts embodied the playing field on which this competition was
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executed.78 Councilman, Orators and Magistrates all could be tried on appeal in the Courts, either
while in office, or during the time they had to “render account”.79 Certainly the Courts had some
administrative powers, like witnessing contracts and auctions of public works, or trying complains by
people selected for military duty, but most of all the courts dealt with political accusations against
magistrates or councilors.80 Access to the courts was limited to the more experienced citizens, who had
sworn to judge justly. Like the magistrates jurors had to be at least 30 years old. Each year 6000
potential jurors were drawn from the general citizenry. These jurors were made to swear the Heliastic
Oath which reads as follows: “I will cast my vote in consonance with the laws and with the decrees
passed by the Assembly and by the Council, but, if there is no law, in consonance with my sense of
what is most just, without favor or enmity. I will vote on the matters raised in the charge, and I will
listen impartially to accusers and defenders alike.”81 Thus the courts upheld, in all cases possible, the
laws and decrees of the Assembly and council. However, in cases of tort, the citizen was trusted to listen
impartially to the arguments presented. As such, the courts were again an institution of the community.
The large number of jurors, as well as their random allocation to different courts, resulted in a
certain level of anonymity which helped the jurors judge impartially.82 On a given day when the court
was in session, from these 6000 a specific number was chosen by sortition. From those chosen the
process of sortition placed jurors in specific courts. There are examples of panels of 1001, 1501, 2001,
and 2501 jurors for political trials.83 It was therefore difficult for any citizen to influence the jurors
individually. The jurors could also not be influenced easily as a whole by those trained in rhetoric,
because the citizen accused had to personally defend himself. There was no official prosecutor, cases
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had to be brought and argued by ordinary citizens.84 If fact, it was a punishable offense to have
someone else argue on one’s behalf.85 These methods were effective- the juror was protected by
anonymity while each defendant equally represented their own case.
Involving 6000 jurors between 175 and 225 times a year put a financial constraint on all jurors.
The Courts sat usually for a whole day, which meant 9½ hours derived from the shortest day in the year
judging up to 4 cases a day.86 The Athenians resolved the financial constraint caused by the frequency
of these judicial sessions by paying each juror 3 obols a day for his services, which was half of what one
received by attending the General Assembly.87 This may suggest that mainly the poor had an incentive
to sit in Court, however, 3 obols was far below the average daily wage of a worker.88 Therefore, Hansen
suggests that mostly the elderly, those whose physical ability deprived them of executing hard labor, sat
in court.89 He invokes the image of sons and grandsons helping their family elder to court. 90
With the magistrate preparing the cases, all three entities, the jurors, the defendant and the
magistrate, had no judicial expertise. As Hansen wrote: “Thus, a law-case at Athens was a play with
three characters, all amateurs: the citizen who brought the charge, the magistrate who prepared the
case and presided over the courts, and the jury who heard the case and gave judgement.”91 This lack of
professional involvement, guaranteed the rule of the demos in the courts, as opposed to the rule of
some judicial elite. Therefore again, the community ruled itself also in questions of the law.
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All institutions that had decisive power in Ancient Athens were those that involved mass
participation. Following the idea of “democracy,” all power remained with the demos. Because of this
power Ober calls the demos free in a political context. But it is the aspect of equality, Ober mentions in
his definition of democracy, that is more intriguing. Certainly some members of the demos became
councilman or magistrates or jurors and others didn’t. How then were they considered equal to one
another?
Sortition allowed the principles of equality to prevail even in events of distinction and that, as
such, the demos “remained” politically free.92 The demos taken as a single entity, may suggest equality
in the abstract, or equality in the assembly, but not equality of the individual. When some became
Councilors and others did not how were they equal? Simply said: equality seems to cease when any
form of distinction is present. However, if equality exists when equals are treated equal, and unequals
unequal, then equality ceases to exist when unequals are treated equal. As Manin points out this can be
easily understood in mathematical terms where we assume that a/b=a/b, and a/B=a/B, but not a/
B=a/b.93 Such an idea of equality always forces the arbitrator’s to adjust equality to unequals.94
The Greeks solved this problem of “adjustment” by handing it to an agent that was qua
definition impartial, namely chance and based whether one wanted to be judged by this agent on
whether one wanted to participate in politics.95 This form of equality (Isegoria) was based on
voluntarism.96 It was the individual that made itself equal, not the masses. The willingness to be treated
as an equal, which was the willingness to speak up, or to put one’s name down for the draw, created
equality. Sortition therefore was the random allocation of all those willing.
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This form of equality was inspired by the General Assembly. 97 The procedure of speaking up in
the General Assembly was a two stage process "of volunteering to be heard” and then “to be called
upon.” Holding 4000 to 8000 people, later even up to 20,000 and being situated on top of a hill made
it acoustically a challenging to speak up.98 Certainly not everybody spoke, but even those that did faced
a large audience, and due to the winds from the valley below had to shout. Thus, even thought
everybody could technically access the podium and speak, mostly those that were skilled in public
speech took the chance. When Manin points out that banning the elites to the outskirts of the political
process showed a deep distrust the Athenian demos had toward them, this divide seemed to have been
underlined by the physical implications of the setting of the General Assembly in the Ekklesia.
Nevertheless, technically, every participant in the Assembly had a right to speak up, that is, go up to the
podium and address the demos.99 Whether one gained access depended on whether on was seen, that is
called upon. One could argue that personal connections may have been the deciding factor, but the
amount of people present makes that unlikely.100 Rather, whether one was called upon or not may have
felt like it was dependent on chance.101
Manin suggests that the two stage process “of volunteering to be heard" and then "to be called
upon” was the same praxis that inspired the Athenians to use sortition in other political bodies.102 E.g.
In order to become a court member or a councilman, one had to put one’s name in a Kleroterion.
Thus here again a twofold process of first voluntary participation and secondly random selection
characterized the allotment of offices. The equal probability of being called on was reiterated by the
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drawing of lots, because those wanting to attain public office, here again, first had to make a choice of
putting their name up for the draw. Only secondly did they come under the concept of equality by
having an equal chance to be drawn. The equality (Isegoria) in the General Assembly was thus reiterated
in the allocation of offices by the method of sortition.
Sortition enabled the Greeks to transfer Isegoria - freedom and equality - they had found in the
empowered demos to the other offices of the state. As Headlam wrote: “It remains however true that
the prime reason for the maintenance of the lot was that, so long as offices were filled by it, the full
supremacy of the Assembly over Council and administration was secured.”103 Since appointment by lot
meant appointment by chance, no representative could justify challenging the supremacy of the
General Assembly and thereby the community. The representative chosen by lot was not considered
better or worse than his peers, but was in fact just one of them. Conversely, sortition was a way of
delegating power that would not discriminate any other way then if the matter had to be discussed in
the General Assembly.
Distinct offices did not so much elevate the individual but the community as a whole. Ober
writes:
The symbolic value of ordinary citizens conducting all levels of state business must have
been considerable. The awe that an Athenian might feel upon confronting a magistrate
(…) would now be a function of the office itself, not of the private status of the
officeholder. Awe would therefore be ascribed to the reflected grandeur of the sate,
which the magistrate in some sense symbolized. 104
The grandeur of the state was immediately reflected in the grandeur of the community. This grandeur
resulted not only from the diminishing mystique of public office, but also from the quantity of people
involved and the subsequent knowledge of governing. Since offices could only be held one year in a row,
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a majority of citizens would serve at least once over their lifetime.105 This rotational principle must have
had a considerable educational effect on the citizenry.
Elections did not suggest themselves to the Athenians. The process of elections would have
created an unwanted distinction between those governing and not governing, as well as effectively invite
less people into office. Instead, “…the rotation requirement [carried] no risk of thwarting the logic of
lot.”106 However, the rotation requirement did thwart the logic of elections, because their was not good
reason why someone who did well in office should not continue to do so, even beyond their one year
service. Generally, to run a campaign for one year of service would not be cost efficient. Systematically
speaking, therefore, the rotation requirement of Athenian democracy made elections undesirable.
Furthermore, the concept of Isegoria is not compatible with the method of elections. While
elections rely on a variety of factors to decide the outcome of a campaign, be it merit or wealth, Isegoria
allows the discriminating principle to be chance. Elections do not reiterate the possibility of equality
within the population. Contrarily, they create distinction between candidate and voter. The hierarchical
distinction between candidate and voter, however, would have risked the egalitarian legitimacy of the
Athenian community. Returning to the introduction to this paper, Sortition in Ancient Athens offered a
way of temporarily elevating the individual to a public persona. It allowed for this individual to try
himself as political being and it allowed for the public to hear diverse and personal experiences of the
citizens chosen.107 This elevation was not much different than taking the floor in the Assembly, except
for the fact, that sortition would allow this elevating to be transferred into smaller political bodies. The
elevation resulting from Isegoria was both empowering (free) and egalitarian and therefore the principle
of democracy.
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The use of sorption in Ancient Athens is indicative of the state of communal trust Athenians
had in each other. Since the central principle of sortition is chance, no Athenian could consider himself
better or worse than his peers by being appointed or denied office. In turn, since sortition chooses
without any particular quality in mind, the Athenians must have had considerable trust in the members
of their community. The process of sortition not only relies on this trust but also enables it. Certainly,
rendering account and collegiality actively kept a given representative in constant connection to his
community. More so, this chosen representative had to keep their private interests at bay. But it was, first
of all, a trust in the community that led an individual to decide to involve himself in politics. This in
itself made sortition possible, and led to the continuation of democracy.
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Chapter II

In the development of modern representative government since Ancient Athens, sortition gave
way to elections— despite or maybe even because of the democratic character of sortition itself. In
Athens, sortition allowed for the demos to extend its reach into all offices under the principles of
freedom and equality. In America today, sortition is at most still present in the jury system. By the time
of the ratification debate between federalists and anti-federalists surrounding the American
Constitution, the process of sortition finds not a single mention. Sortition was, however, part of the
republican tradition. Aristotle, as a contemporary, wrote about the use of lot during his time.
Montesquieu, who was interested in the necessary relations behind political conceptions, commented
on the use of lot in democracies and the use of elections in aristocracies. Rousseau considered it
worthwhile to discuss the properties of lot in relation to his conception of the social contract. And even
Schmitt makes one last mention of sortition, before sortition leaves the ideas of republican thought. It is
evident that somewhere in the republican tradition sortition was entirely replaced by elections. 108
Interestingly enough, the conception of sortition became increasingly limited as the
republication tradition progressed toward the ratification debate. This is apparent in the writings of
Gueffry and Schmitt, where the main quality that distinguished sortition from elections, namely the
impartiality it held towards the qualities of representatives, served as the primary reason behind its
inapplicability within a modern democracy. Their argument roughly suggested that, even though the
people may be unfit to rule themselves, they were certainly fit enough to select their own rulers. The
very fact that elections distinguished candidates form the populous, became, if only rhetorically, the
main argument for the use of elections. It is intuitive, therefore, that the value of community was lost to
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the priority of private interests. This reasoning behind the use elections later becomes crystalized at the
time of the ratification debate.
Additionally, as elections became favored over sortition, all those who thought about political
representation focused on the qualities of the representative rather than the qualities of the citizen.
Where as both Aristotle and Montesquieu centered their arguments around the creation of a virtuous
body politic— by developing positive notions in teaching citizens and upholding community—the
founding fathers focused on a negative contract between the represented and the representative. This
may be another sign indicative of a movement away from community, and the quality of all, toward the
representation of all and the the quality of few.
In order to understand the development that sortition underwent, it seems reasonable to start
with a contemporary to Athenian Democracy and end with the ratification of the American
Constitution. Starting with Aristotle and ending with the ratification has the advantage of paring
political theory in both instances with actual constitutional practice.

Aristotle, a contemporary Demosthenes (384-322 B.C.), did not clearly express in his writings a
preference to one method of choosing representatives over another. He writes that whatever form of
appointing representatives is used is indicative (only) of the form of government to be achieved.109
Sortition, for Aristotle, is linked to democracy, where as elections are linked to aristocracy and
oligarchy.110 Aristotle continues by suggesting that the difference between aristocracy and oligarchy is
one of excellence and wealth.111 Elections within an aristocracy are based on excellence, while in an
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oligarchy they are based on wealth.112 Throughout his writings on this matter there is not, however, a
clear preference expressed for one method over another.
Central to Aristotle’s writings on politics is the question of how to become good, in the sense of
acting good.113 Given his own context, this question may have been inspired by the rule of demos in
Ancient Athens. The Athenian community (or the demos) was only as good as its randomly chosen
representatives. Excellence therefore was a not limited to a few, but a question for all. According to
Aristotle, excellence is achieved through temperate living. The best society is based on “temperate
living,” i.e. a society of the middle class. Achieving this society is difficult. There is only one way to
teach people to be excellent without making becoming excellent arduous, and that way is through law.
However, in order to make good laws that teach people to live an excellent life from childhood on, one
needs good legislatures.
In Aristotle's writing, the need for good legislatures to make good laws revealed a circular
dilemma based on the causality between good legislators and good laws. In order to have good
legislatures, that is a person that rules well, the legislature has to first be a good citizen, a person that is
ruled well.114 However, a person can only be ruled well by good laws.115 This principle called eleuthera ruling and being ruled in turn - exemplifies the causality dilemma: “which came first, the good ruler or
the good law?” No clear starting point can be found in Aristotle’s writing.
Assuming a relationship between merit and excellence one could hypothetically argue that
Aristotle favored elections. In relation to the difference between sortition and elections, one could
assume that in a political context the excellent citizen and the candidate of merit are not that different.
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In order to be a good legislature one had to be first a good citizen (eleutheria).116 In aristocracies,
elections are based on merit.117 Aristoi means the best, maybe therefore also the best candidate. One
could presume, since Aristotle bases aristocracy on excellence, that the elective process achieves finding
the best citizens—but this assumption is de facto not de juro. It is therefore unclear which method of
appointment Aristotle preferred in creating an excellent society.
In linking sortition with democracy and elections with aristocracy, Aristotle influenced many
other considerations on representative government the republican tradition. For example, Montesquieu,
like Aristotle, links the method of lot with democracy and the method of elections with aristocracy. He
writes:
The suffrage by lot is natural to democracy; as that by choice is to aristocracy. The
suffrage by lot is a method of electing that offends no one, but animates each citizen
with the pleasing hope of serving his country. Yes, as this method is in itself defective,
it has been the endeavor of the most eminent legislators to regulate and ament
it. 118’ 119
Montesquieu mentions directly the two principles central to democracy, namely freedom and equality.
Lot is natural to democracy because it does not cause any exterior distinction between citizens; rather, it
equalizes the chance of each citizen to serve in office. In turn, this equality animates each citizen to
serve. The defect of sortition lies in precisely the fact that it does not distinguish, in the sense that it does
not give preference to a certain person for a certain position in office. Subsequently, Montesquieu
mentions the laws implemented by Solon.120 These laws ensured that military and financial offices were
filled with those most adequate to do so, namely the trained and the rich. This disregard of
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professionals in specific offices can arguably be corrected by putting specific offices up for elections, or
introducing certain prerequisites for candidacy.121
Nevertheless, Montesquieu assumes that generally people are not in a position to govern
themselves. He writes that “As most citizens have sufficient ability to choose, though unqualified to be
chosen, so the people, though capable of calling others to an account for their administration, are
incapable of conducting the administration themselves.”122 The French for “choose” and “be chosen” is
“élire” and “être élus” respectively. However, “élire” is not the word Montesquieu uses when he says
that aristocracies use choice. Instead, he uses the noun “choix.” The corresponding noun to “élire”
would be "élit" (like the English elite), and the corresponding verb to “choix” would be choisir (to
choose). The ones chosen then, are the elite, as opposed to “choissant,” those choosing. This suggests
that the elite therefore is created by the choosing.
Montesquieu suggests that the distinction between the elite and those choosing is not so much
based on skill, or practicality. Instead, Montesquieu suggests that the elite are competitive whereas the
people are passionate.123 The English translation from the quote above reads as “incapable of
conducting the administration themselves” and reads in the French as: “…(le peuble) n’est pas propre à
gérer par lui-même.” “Propre a gérer” means something like “properly waging,” or “properly
managing.” Including the people, the phrase could be translated as: “…the people are not proper to
manage (or wage) themselves. Another translation, which would emphasize the “par lui-même” would
read: “…the people are not proper for managing themselves.” The reason why the people are not
proper for managing themselves is because they act passionately. The elite, or “those chosen”, do not so
much act passionately as the they act competitively. To act competitively is on the basis of interests. The
reason why the people are not equipped to manage themselves is because they do not have interests, but
121
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rather passions.124 It is a tremendous insight of Montesquieu to claim that the people act according to
passion and the elite, or rather the aristocracy, act accord to their interests.125 By linking political
interests with aristocracy, Montesquieu subsequently links these interests with the method of
elections.126
The people being inadequate to manage themselves is not the only reason for elections.127
Another reason for why aristocracy uses elections is based on the preexistence of an elite. Montesquieu
writes,
They do not here [in an aristocracy] choose by lot, for this would be productive of
inconveniences only. And indeed, in a government where the most mortifying distinctions
are already established, though they were to be chosen by lot, still they would not cease to
be odious; it is the nobleman they envy, and not the magistrate.128
A magistrate chosen by sortition in an aristocracy would be an inconvenience to government. The
noblemen is still superior and the distinction between nobles and citizens prevalent. Sortition could
therefore not “equalize” this society, because the envy for nobility would still exist. In turn, the
advantages sortition has in a democracy (of neither discriminating nor humiliating those that are not
chosen) are still its disadvantages in an aristocracy.129
The obvious distinction between the aristocracy and the people is not interrupted by the method
of elections to allocate political office. Montesquieu seems to assume that elections will keep this
distinction alive, without particularly mentioning any constraints on possible candidates. The absence
of, e.g. property qualifications, is striking in this context, because it simply suggests that elections, qua
The notion of being unable to conduct the administration themselves can be explained by the following quote:
“Intriguing in a senate is dangerous; it is dangerous also in a body of nobles; but no so among the people, whose nature is to
act through passion.” Ibid., 14.
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definition, will keep the distinction between the elite and the people alive. This suggestion may have
been inspired by the narrative of Xenophon who related that even though the Ancient Roman people
of the lower classes had the chance and ability to elect one of their own into office, they never did so.
Montesquieu takes this to mean that in most cases people from the lower classes are simply not fit for
government, but that they are wise enough to realize their own incapability. He thus suggests that the
capability to govern is mostly thought to be found within the upper classes, even by the votes of the
lower classes. Basing elections on interests means that elections naturally keep these distinctions alive,
and this is the reason why they are used in an aristocracy.
Following the thought of Aristotle and Montesquieu, Rousseau also pairs the method of
sortition with democracy. Rousseau arrives at this conclusion from a different argument, however. He
suggests that “…if we bear in mind that the election of rulers is a function of government, and not of
Sovereignty, we shall see why the lot is the method more natural to democracy, in which the
administration is better in proportion as the number of its acts is small.”130 Rousseau suggests that the
method of appointing representatives is not a power deriving from sovereignty, but a power deriving
form government. In his conception of the social contract government stands for administrative or
executive power. Sovereignty, the power that remains with the people at all times, describes the exercise
of the “general will.”131 This general will constitutes law (Book II, 1) and under the law everybody is
equal (Book II, 4). Now in a democracy, government is given to at least the majority of people, as the
term suggests. In that sense the sovereign - that is the general will of the people - and the government that is the administrative power of the general will - are confined in the same body, the people. It is,
however, dangerous, if government and sovereignty are confined in the same body. Rousseau suggests
that “…it is not good for him who makes the laws to execute them, nor for the body of the people to
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turn its attention away from general considerations to particular objects.”132 The danger Rousseau sees
is that if those that make the laws also execute the laws, they are likely to discriminate against the
generality of law. It is therefore best, as Rousseau states above, for a democracy to commit a few
government acts as possible.
The reason why democracy should commit as few acts as possible derives from the fallibility of
men.133 As Rousseau writes, “if there were a people of Gods, it would govern itself democratically.
Such perfect government is not suited for men.”134 Only Gods would be able to act as sovereign and
government at the same time because they would be able to distinguish their interests and thoughts as
concerning the general views and particular views when acting as sovereign and government
respectively. Acknowledging this, Manin concludes that “…this is beyond human capacity.”135 Because
the people cannot, at the same time, act generally and particularly, they also cannot embody legislative
and administrative tasks at the same time. Acknowledging this limitation, Rousseau suggests, would
naturally lead to a limitation on the role government plays.
In an aristocracy, the sovereign and the government are not confined in the same body. This is
mainly because the aristocracy relies on majority voting. In an aristocracy, “…the prince chooses the
prince, the government is preserved by itself, and voting is rightly ordered.”136 The aristocracy as a form
of government chooses itself. The General Will here finds expression by the counting of votes, which
Rousseau adds “…is rightly ordered.” In this case, “rightly ordered” refers to the principle that the
general will is found in the majority.137 “The prince choses the prince,” assumes that a distinctive
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principle relating aristocratic membership is already established, and that this distinctive principle tells
sovereignty apart from government.
The consent of voting is the only method to transfer power from the sovereign to the
government and therefore the only form of legitimate government. However, this consent might very
well be inspired by merit or talent. Rousseau suggests that…
Election by lot would have few disadvantages in a real democracy, in which, as
equality would everywhere exist in morals and talents as well as in principles and
fortunes, it would become almost a matter of indifference who was chosen. But I have
already said that a real democracy is only an ideal.138
A real democracy is, according to Rousseau, a society where morals and talents are distributed equally.
It is a society where everyone’s ability is equal to everybody else’s. In that sense, in a real democracy
choosing would not resemble a choice. Conversely, in a real society, talents and morals are not
distributed equally. Since democracy cannot use the method of lot, it has to use the method of
elections, in order to concentrate these talents in government. Would the result then be an aristocracy?
Rousseau distinguishes between three kinds of aristocracy, which he labels as natural, elective
and hereditary. He suggests that “…the first is only for simple peoples; the third is the worst of all
governments; the second is the best, and is aristocracy properly so called.”139 By natural aristocracy
Rousseau means the natural increase of experience by age, a certain form of authority, that the first
states - the family - were based on. Elective aristocracy explains itself and refers to the original sense of
the word aristoi, the best. The method of elections then can identify this elective aristocracy. As
Rousseau writes: “By this means (of choosing) uprightness, understanding, experience, and all other
claims to pre-eminence and public esteem become so many further guarantees of wise government.”140
The effect: “In a word, it is the best and most natural arrangement that the wisest should govern the
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many, when it is assured that they will govern for its profit, and not for their own.”141 However it is
important that the aristocracy does not the choosing of its members, because if it would its members
would want to secure their dominance and develop a hereditary aristocracy. Thus the choosing must
stay with the sovereign that is the choice must lie with the citizen.
Rousseau preferred aristocracy because it does not create a conflict between the particular will
and the general will. Further, employing the method of elections brings talents to light. Lot wouldn’t
create a conflict between the general will and the particular will in a democracy, but it wouldn’t bring
talents to light as efficiently as elections. However, elections are the wrong method for a democracy
because it would mean the sovereign decided both the method of appointing officials (elections) and the
officials. Where the later action depends on the former action, corruption of who would be eligible for
office, Rousseau thinks, would be likely. We thus conclude that the problem of sortition is that it doesn’t
discriminate for talents. And the problem of democracy that it is incompatible with the method of
elections.
What is interesting is that both Montesquieu and Rousseau saw the obvious defect of sortition
that strikes us today, which is its indifference towards talent. Manin suggests that, despite this, “...both
writers perceived that lot had also other properties or merits that at least made it an alternative worthy
of serious consideration, and perhaps justified that one should seek to remedy the obvious defect with
other institutions.”142 This is interesting because Montesquieu and Rousseau seem to be the last writers
of the republican tradition that give lot any significant consideration.
Within decades the idea of lot disappeared, even though at the time lot was considered very
much part of the republican tradition.143 Although we can only hypothesize what happened, it is clear
that in the American and French constitutions lot does not gain significant discussion among the
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respective founders. As Manin writes:
It is certainly not surprising that the founders of representative government did not
consider selecting rulers endowed with full freedom of action by drawing of lots from
among the entire population. What is surprising is that the use of lot, even in
combination with other institutions, did not receive any serious hearing at all. 144
The lack of a consideration of sortition occurred despite there being historical examples in its favor. For
instance, the basic defect of lot could be addressed by allocating only certain offices to the general
population and reserving others (like finance and military offices) for the established elite. This obvious
remedy however did not keep lot from fading into obscurity.
Most writers of the republican tradition that have considered lot, even if only peripherally in
their writings, considered it’s main aspect - that it does not distinguish - also as the reason for which it is
inapplicable. The argument we find in Gueniffey and Schmitt is that lot would only be applicable if
every citizen was the same, so that subsequently choosing some of them at random simply wouldn’t
resemble a choice.145 ’146 This limited consideration falls short of all the other properties lot has, as
pointed out in chapter one. Furthermore, this limited consideration seems to show a shift in thinking
about political representation that focuses increasingly on the qualities of the representatives and
decreasingly on the qualities of the citizens. As Aristotle and Montesquieu have thought about how to
create a virtuous body politic - by developing positive notions in teaching the citizens - Rousseau
already focuses on the negative contract, between represented and representative. He emphasized the
need of separating sovereignty from government through the procedure of elections, so that elections
endow the latter with the general will of the former. The citizen then not only shifts from being the
subject of education to being the object of liberty, but also from being considered as a qualitative agent,
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to not bearing any quality, but the ability to consent to government.147
This principle of consent carried through the Putney debates in Cromwell’s England and
formed the basis of authority in the legalist writers like Rousseau, Hobbes and Lock.148 A century later
we find this principle in the opening lines of the American Declaration of Independence:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. - That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. 149
Manin also notes that in August 1789 Thouret published a draft that said that “…all citizens have the
right to concur, individuality or through their representative, in the formation of the laws, and to submit
only to those to which they have freely consented.”150
The connection between consent and government is explicitly stated by John Lock’s Second
Treatise on Government, when he writes that “…men being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, equal, and
independent, no one may be taken from this Estate and subjected to the Political Power of another but
by his own consent.” Three pages later he continues, “And thus that, which actually constitutes any Political
Society, is nothing but the consent of any number of Freeman capable of a majority to unite and
incorporate themselves into such a Society. And this is that and that only which did, or could give
beginning to any lawful Government in the World.”151 Any dissent to the principle of consent is not possible,
as any breach of the law established by the general will would be seen as a breach against society.152
With consent becoming the main focus of political legitimacy, the citizen can only reiterate either his
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consent, or change the general will. These are the two powers he is endowed with. To reiterate consent
is not a choice; and to change the general will is unfeasible for the individual.
As Manin notes, under this principle of consent elections are the logical choice of choosing
representatives because choice actively conveys the consent of being governed.153 Sortition cannot be
perceived as an expression of consent through choice.154 The democratic character of sortition
therefore could not find continuation in government based on consent.
The ability to consent to government also went hand in hand with the notion of private
property. As Rousseau noted, only those qualities of life that are affected by the social contract are
subject to the general will, all other qualities remain untouched and have to remain untouched; they are
freely at the discretion of the individual. Basing government on the consent of the voter in turn meant
leaving a certain area of life— private property — at the discretion of the voter. The idea of privacy
and consent appears to be mutually dependent.
As suggested above one can only hypothesize when and how the principle of consent was linked
to elections, much in the same way as it has been hypothesized that sortition derived from the General
Assembly. It seems that consent in this context relates to authority, thereby consent becomes the
indicator of legitimacy of this authority. This legalist approach had a legalists base, which in the context
of the development of the modern state, i.e. the French and the US constitutions, was the claim for
equality under the law. The need to extend equality under law to all citizens went hand in hand with
the need to manufacture consent for implementing this equality.
Max Weber writes about how equality finds its rational administration in bureaucracy.155 Weber
writes that:
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….bureaucracy inevitably accompanies modern mass democracy, in contrast to the
democratic self-government of small homogenous units. This results from its
characteristic principle: the abstract regularity of the exercise of authority, which is a
result of the demand for ‘equality before the law in the personal and functional sense hence, of the horror of ‘privilege,’ and the principled rejections of doing business ‘from
case to case.’156
The fear of not being treated equal causes government to administer this equality. The increase in the
size of states that hold equality as a principle of legitimacy of government necessitates the abstraction
of equality in the form of law. This abstract equality, as opposed to the kind of equality administered
on a case to case basis by collegial bodies, causes the need for bureaucratic administration.
As any form of power also this bureaucratic administration has its performative agents that
administer the equality of society.157 However, given the abstract quality of these laws, the bureaucracy
is in need of an elite.158 This elite has to be skilled in juristic administration. To make society equal,
government needs someone to achieve equality. But this person or group will no longer be equal to
society, because society endows them with the power to make everyone equal.
The disparity between those that administer the law and those that experience the
administration thereof, is a disparity of power, and as Weber further explains, in a rational society
quickly also a disparity of class. “The growing complexity of administrative tasks and the sheer
expansion of their scope increasingly results in the technical superiority of those who have had training
and experience, and will thus inevitably favor the continuity of at lest some of the functionaries.”159
The persons administrating the law will on account of their rational skills make a distinctive class of
educated individuals, not only because of special talents or luck but most of all leisure. When Aristotle
talks about the necessity of providing enough income to create a leisured class of citizens that can spend
their time administering the laws of the state, he hints at a universal principle of necessity. In a modern
156

Weber, Roth, and Wittich, Economy and Society, 225.

157

Weber, Roth, and Wittich, Economy and Society, 949.

158

Weber, Roth, and Wittich, Economy and Society, 950.

159

Ibid.

34

society this principle is still valid and is reified by those that have the means, both in terms of leisure
and wealth, to gain an adequate education to fulfill administrative tasks.160
In terms of the question of sortition or election, it is clear that the persons administering the law
are usually not chosen by the population and therefore only peripherally important for the sake of this
paper. They are not politicians per se, but rather public servants. However, their existence as a
homogenized rational body demands also for elected or chosen representatives of the people to act in a
rational and somewhat homogenized way.161 The elite, that is thus created by bureaucracy causes
representative government to respond in two ways. The first, it needs to be rational itself, so that the
representatives are able enough to respond to the rational action of bureaucracy. Therefore the
bureaucratic elite is schooled in effectively administrating social action. Weber writes that beside private
enterprise, the bureaucratic apparatus is the most rational administrator of social action. Political
interests thus have to find an equally rational form of representation so as to match the effectiveness of
bureaucracy.162 This means that representatives have to be able individuals, that are part of a rational
body with a political interests, that is a party.
The second necessary implication is that representative government is in need of the consent of
the ‘masses’ to continue and amend this bureaucracy.163 Generally speaking, any administration of
domination needs justification.164 Justification in the political context is legitimacy.165 There are different
forms of legitimacy for different authorities. The administrators, as well as the lawmakers, need to be
made legitimate. The administration of equality needs to constantly manufacture consent to their role
“The growing complexity of administrative tasks and the sheer expansion of their scope increasingly result in the
technical superiority of those who have had training and experience, and will thus inevitably favor the continuity of at lest
some of the functionaries.” Ibid., 1000.
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of doing so. The lawmakers need to consent to amend this administration. According to Weber, the law
legitimizes itself through rational authority. Those that administer equality therefore also are legitimate
qua their rational necessity.166 The lawmakers, however, legitimize themselves through charismatic
authority, qua being elected.167
Unfortunately, Weber does not specifically relate why elections are the only applicable method to
legitimize charismatic authority. But the reasons can be derived from the structure such representation
takes. According to Weber there are two forms of representation at work in modern democracies;
instructed and free representation. The representative is free in the sense that he is free to vote on any
issue however he sees fit. But, since he wants to be elected and reelected, and since he, for that purpose
campaigns on certain interests, the representative is also to some extend instructed on representing both
his promises he made to his voter base.168 Arguably in modern politics both of these forms of
representation are at work. However, Weber sees free representation as the primary characteristic of the
appointment of representatives in parliament. As he writes:
Free representation in this sense is not uncommonly an unavoidable consequence of
the incompleteness or absence of instructions, but in other cases it is the deliberate
object of choice. In so far as this is true, the representative, by virtue of his election,
exercises authority over the electors and is not merely their agent. The most prominent
example of this type is modern parliamentary representation. It shares with legal
authority the general tendency to impersonality, the obligation to conform to abstract
norms, politic or ethical. This feature is most pronounced in the case of the
parliaments, the representative bodies of the modern political organizations. Their
function is not understandable apart from the voluntaristic intervention of the parties.
It is the parties which present candidates and programs to the politically passive
citizens. They also, by the process of compromise and balloting within parliament,
create the norms which govern the administrative process.169
Interestingly Weber links free representation immediately to the creation of parties, that present to the
“passive citizen” their form of government. The need for parties derives to some extend out of the
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character of free representation in the context of bureaucracy.170 Therefore the power between those
voting and those voted for is likely to be inverted by the creation of a party program.
Parties, however, are necessary for candidates to rationally and effectively campaign. Candidates
campaign to gain a mandate depend on the support structure of a party both to extend their campaign
program, run a campaign, and finical support. Likewise does the party depend on its candidates in
order to receive incumbency, which it will then use to fill government with its own members.171
Therefore, the legitimacy of free representation also immediately implies the creation of parties.
Sortition would be a way of mandating free representation. Since sortition does not rely on a
campaign, the representative would be completely free in his votes. But since sortition does not rely on a
campaign, it also does not rely on the rational structure of a party. However, since the rationality of
social action, is necessary in the modern bureaucratic state, so is the campaign, so is the party and so
are elections. Therefore it is the rationality of bureaucracy that makes sortition inapt.
To sum up so far: The legal approach to equality results in two major implications for the
political playing field: in terms of equality, the equalization of every citizen creates necessarily a rational
bureaucracy. In terms of representation, potential candidates need to form parties in order to be
powerful enough and coordinated enough to both manage large scale campaigns and lobbies and
effectively oppose the rational action of bureaucracy. The need for parties implies a third and a forth
aspect of modern democracies. The third, even though this is an aspect Weber not explicitly argues but
rather seems to take for granted, is the use of elections. Weber writes, that with the development of
bureaucracy, collegiality became in need on a single decision maker, e.g. a prime minister, or a
president, that is generally, in need of hierarchy. This hierarchy was needed as much within a body of
representatives as between the general population and the representative himself.172
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However, in order to legitimize this hierarchy, representatives had to create an incentive for the
general population to accept this hierarchy. The incentive was the representation of political interests,
as Weber writes. “Where voting takes a course in accord with legitimate expectation they are legal
parties. The existence of legal parties, because of the fact that their basis is fundamentally one of
voluntary adherence, always means that the business of politics is the pursuit of interests.”173 Were the
candidate not campaigning on some form of political interest he would have no reason to receive any
votes. This means in turn that necessarily all majority elected free representatives are elected on the
basis of political interests. Therefore, modern representative governments tend to focus almost
exclusively on the politics of interests.174’175
The legal approach to equality necessitates bureaucracy. But it also necessitates the politics of
interests. It is intuitive that political interests and equality are prone to collide. The interests of some are
not the interests of all, and interests do not necessarily have to focus on making oneself more equal.
Nevertheless, as Weber shows, both the administration of equality and political interests are mutually
dependent in the modern representative democracy.176’177
This contradiction and likewise mutual dependency of bureaucratic equality and political
interests poses a challenge to those designing a constitution. In the operation of a government they will
want to account for both, equality and the political interest, or in other words equality and personal
freedom of ambition.178 However the creation of political interests will in the long run only give a
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political position to those with interests, which in the extreme then only necessitates political freedom that is action - for those interests.179 Having the whole polity be run by political interests my turn all
attention away from equality or freedom, because whatever is not presented as a political interest does
not become a political issue.180
Robert J. Pranger and Hannah Arendt writes on this dilemma in the context of the USConstitution. They both identify the preponderance of political interests on the federal level as a
corruption of that overarching government today.181 Rather, in the design of the founding fathers,
political interests, or in their language “factions,” were supposed to remain largely on the local - or state
level. The necessary relation between politics of interests and elections however, caused these interests
to creep into almost all branches of the federal government.
According to Pranger the design of the Federal Government was precisely to check on political
interests.182 Political interests would result locally and the Federal Government was supposed to check
these interests. Thereby the federal government embodied both the support of local interests and the
check on local interests. However, today, the locality of interests has corrupted the Federal
Government.183
According to Pranger the founders understood that private ambitions and the public good
would collide in the long run.184 They also understood that doing away with private ambitions would
stall the whole endeavor of a free republic. Therefore the union had to accommodate for both, private
ambitions and the check thereof, and it did so by separating local or state politics from national politics.

Of course there are other freedoms, like the freedom to speech or the freedom to deviate, but as long as these freedoms
are not related to any actual activity, they remain mere ideas.
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As Pranger writes: “national power would diffuse ambition, mitigate despotism, lend itself to
cosmopolitan toleration and considerations of public good, whereas local power would bring into sharp
focus narrow interest, factious ambition and power politics.” (Pranger, 97) On a state level private
ambitions, or, in the language of this paper, politics of interests, would be found. On a federal level
these ambitions should be checked in respect to the development of the public good.
Pranger identifies two liberties that would embody this antagonism. The liberty of preemption
and the liberty to deviate. As he writes:
In a way, this would be anarchy secured against its own excesses, a safe liberty, a form of
political economy somewhat like laissez-faire. Instead of defining the nation, it was believed
that the nation would define itself spatially and temporally as it explored the full potentials of
its main purpose. The “fullness” of liberty would be twofold, the liberty to preempt others or to
compete with others, and the liberty to deviate through the practices of toleration for others.
For preemptive liberty, there were two virtues, the one emphasizing self-interested competition
or ambition, the other encouraging assertive creativity. In the case of the liberty to deviate, the
main virtue was diversity or toleration.185
On the one hand, the liberty to preempt is the freedom to personal ambition and creativity. It
allowed for the realization of the individuals ambitions, that would, in a political sense, become the
politics of interests. The liberty to deviate is the liberty to be of a different opinion, a liberty that the
federal government would have to cherish in a culture of tolerance. These two liberties also informed
two ways of politics. The liberty of preemption was interest based, therefore election based, and
therefore created politics of competition. The liberty to deviate, deliberative, or forum based, therefore
not competitive but rather amicable and in search of harmony. In the Federal Government interests
were supposed to be represented in the House of Representatives through elections. And tolerance
through appointment of collegial bodies, that is the Senate, the Presidency and the Courts. The Federal
Government therefore was designed to account for both liberties.
The character of the politics of tolerance can be best understood by looking first at the
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character of the politics of interests. The politics of interests are always dependent on getting
something or demanding something.186 They always include power-play. Resulting from the freedom to
be ambitious and creative for the advancement of one’s personal interests, let that be economical or
social, the interest is soon made aggregate by the system of elections. Only aggregate interests find
majority positions.187 Therefore in a political context, this interest will soon be competitive and
assertive.
At the basis of both self-interested competition and assertive creativity lies the goal to master
another persons will.188 This power-play in the context of elections and parties created the same party
structures that Weber speaks of. As Pranger writes:
“The difficulty was that “the people” could be embodied at the national level, in the
politics of competition, only in majority and minority coalition parties which, in effect,
emphasized the preemptive claims of their members in public policy. Not only did
fragmentation of national government result, but to manage these complicated demands
organizational hierarchy was perfected at the national level.”189
The problem was that the people could make themselves heard only via the method of elections
which in turn demanded majority interests and excessive power play, as has been suggested in the
introduction to this paper. But power play in the federal government is dangerous precisely because
“When organized power comes to dominate the national center, the idea of the nation being the
broadest forum for its citizenry is replaced by a believe that what organization cannot handle is not a
national issue at all. Opens and breath are superseded by excessive strict and narrowness.”190 Once the
whole government is orientated towards interest politics, not other politics can be imagined. Instead the
whole polity adapts to the culture of interest politics.
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This culture of interest politics is not only indicative of the competition between different
representatives, but also of the relationship between voter and politician. As Pranger writes: “Those
that are prominent are those doing the speaking, not those listening. And the so-called listeners or
“audience” appreciate the fact: they turn on their television sets to appreciate or deprecate the speaker,
not to hear him. He, or she, in turn, desires their appreciation of deprecation (votes will do or positive
gestures to the pollster).”191 The politics of condemnation also extend to the space between the citizens,
when politics, that are administered like war zones, clearly identify the enemy in the deviating voices.
“There is an increasing tendency to pigeon-hole groups of persons who need drastic action taken
against them, virtual enemies of the public good who turn out to be, on closer inspection, hated
enemies of newer coalitions of minorities.”192 Therefore the speech involved in the politics of interests
stands opposite to any speech exemplifying toleration.
The speech involved in interest politics is usually addressed to large audiences, there is no dialog
and usually the conclusion of the speech is somewhat predictable by the membership of the speaker.193
The “audience” listening, only collects cue’s for membership and affiliation, rarely however will be
presented with a paradox contradicting expected political vocation. “Such listening is barely conscious
in a great many instances, but rather filed through a gauntlet laid down by numerous personal and
group variables that automatically filter out dissonant messages.”194 It therefore is usually of little
importance what the person speaking actually says, the focus rather lies on who is speaking.
The distinction between those that act, the politicians, and those that watch, the potential voter,
develops therefore a mere necessity of administration to the inherent semiotics of politics. The voter
becomes merely the viewer to the game, hoping to “win,” ready to cry out in anguish and despair at
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any foul by the opponent, and happy to ignore the own teams foul play. The rhetoric of, but also against
and around, Donald Trump takes this game to a unprecedented speed, and interest politics to their
rational end.195 The viewer remains entirely at the passive, “civic participation will always appear as
subject to the speech and symbols developed by leaders, activists and influentials.”196 No wonder, that
the contemporary citizen feels disenchanted from democratic politics.
Opposite to the power driven interest politics the founding fathers had envisioned the public
good of tolerance. This good, - tolerance, or national unity - is hard to imagine from a contemporary
perspective, so much have the national services been domesticated. By domestication they have
“(cleared) the way for private interest’s access to every nook and cranny of the national center, in the
process blurring the concept of a focus for national unity to national interests.”197 The ability to create a
culture of tolerance became forgotten.
But the federalists envisioned the Union to build community. They left it open what this
community would be like, leaving it to the people to create this culture. But they envisioned the “full”
liberty.
Characteristic of the liberty of tolerance is the political process of speaking and listening. This
form of speech stands in direct opposition to the semiotics of interests politics. The liberty of toleration
has to be imagined in a realm of politics that is more than the simple search or the acquisition of
power. “What needs to follow is a rethinking of political space in such a way that political listening is
also broadened from only vertical orientation toward what is said in the spaces of power, to orientation
toward horizontal interaction with one’s fellow citizens as well.”198 Toleration is not assertive or in
search of power, but rather amicable; the idea of listing to others, that express their views in a manner
it is not the point of this paper to reflect on current political issues, but I cannot help myself form saying that
Trump seems to be the rational telos of power politics, fueled by the system of elections.
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that is free from power-play. The political space where such “listening” takes place Pranger calls a
“forum.”199 Instead of assertive persuasion, the speaker explains. Instead of pigeon-holing, the
audience listens. Instead of hierarchy, the forum is collegial. There is no need for the great expedience
of efficiency but rather there is need for thoroughness in speaking and listening. The speaker is held to
rely, to the best of their ability, their political experience. And the audience is held to listen so as to the
best of their ability understand this unique experience.200
Instead of an homogenized narrative of political identity, that is as much need as it is part of the
elective power politics, the forum would hear personal statements from diverse viewpoints,. Hearing
diverse viewpoints creates a space, in which citizen’s experience what it means to life with someone one
disagrees with. Plurality of personal expression is the political good here that turns into public good by
being heard and understood. The public good of hearing and understanding diverse viewpoints is
tolerance.201
Two characteristics of this forum stand out in comparison to interest based politics. One is the
speech involved. Rather than being based on persuasion and competition, this speech would be based
on diversity and amicability. The second characteristic in a public context would be the distance
between those that are acting and those that are not. If the people would find themselves too far at a
distant to those speaking, they could not identify with the personal views given. The distinction inherent
through the psychological implications of elections would somehow have to be overcome in order to
make the diversity of personal political testimonies count.
Sortition could meet both of these criteria. In terms of the implications of speech sortition
could create a forum of peers with personal and unique political viewpoints. Whether sortition can
create tolerance through will be discussed in chapter four. In terms of the psychological distance
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sortition would not uphold the principle of distinction inherent in elections. Sortition therefore would
overcome the psychological distance between citizen and representative. In order to understand how
sortition overcomes this distinction, it is important to look at how elections create this distinction. In this
context it is worthwhile to look at what the founding fathers imagined representative democracy would
imply for both the voter and the representative on the federal level.
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Chapter III

Indicative of the question of who gets to participate in office in an elective system was the
ratification debate between federalists and anti-federalists. The contestation about the effects of the
method of election referred to the House of Representatives. The constitution that found ratification
one year later in 1789 states in Article I, Section 2: “The House of Representatives shall be composed
of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each
State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numbers Branch if the State
Legislature.” This bigger, and lower house of Congress was the only place in the US constitution at that
time, which employed the method of election between the general citizen and the government. The
other institution we now consider working under the method of election, namely the Presidency and
the Senate, were originally appointed by the individual States.202

There

were

three

requirements to be elected Congressman. “No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty-five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who
shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.” (II,1) There was
however another principle distinction the Anti-Federalist noted in the method election the way it was
laid out in the constitution; namely the identification of the natural aristocracy by the method of
election. The difference between the Federalist and the Anti-federalists was that the former considered
elections necessary and sufficient while the latter considered them necessary but as proposed by the
constitution, as naturally biased toward the “natural aristocracy.”203
202
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The idea of natural aristocracy, as has been pointed out previously, resembles Rousseau’s idea of an “elected aristocracy.”
The notion implied is that by virtue of elections the natural aristocracy is found “naturally.”
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The debate did not evolve around the need for elections (also if this point was made rhetorically
by both sides) but rather about the character of the persons elected.204 The anti-fed stressed the
importance of a “like image” of the representatives to the represented, whereas the federalists rather
insisted on the fact that the representatives shall be the most virtuous and talented.205 As Brutus
wrote:206
…the very term representative, implies, that the person or body chosen for this
purpose, should resemble those who appoint them - a representation of the people
of America, if it be a true one, must be like the people… They are the sign - the
people are the thing signified… It must then have been intended that those who are
placed instead of the people, should possess their sentiments and feelings, and be
governed by their interests, or in other words, should bear the strongest
resemblance of those in whose room they are substituted. It is obvious that for an
Assembly to be true likeness of the people of any country, they must be
considerably numerous. 207
Melancton Smith reiterates this idea in his speech at the New York ratification convention: “The idea
that naturally suggests itself to our minds, when we speak of representatives, is it that they resemble
those they represent; they should be a true picture of the people: posses the knowledge of their
circumstances and their wants; sympathize in all their distresses, and be disposed to see their true
interests.”208 In both instances the demand was for a representative body of government to resemble
the people; to signify the thing signified.209 To be in their political properties (and by that term he
means all things related to the political) a mirror image to their constituency.
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The idea of a like image played an important role in the configuration of the house as the AntiFederalists imagined it.210 They insisted that in order to resemble adequately the people, the House of
Representatives would have to be more numerous than suggested. The provision in the constitution
stating that “one representative for every thirty thousand citizens, but at least one representative per
state”211 was insufficient.
The Federalist retorted that a large body of representatives would be impractical to the decision
making process. Further Madison asserted that: “…it follows that if the proportion of fit characters (to
the general population) be no less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a
greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.”212 Madison’s suggesting that fit
representation increases quantitatively (and qualitatively) but not proportionally is striking because it
suggest that he considered representation not so much as a comprehensive or a exhaustive task, but as a
unique task. The representative does not so much embody those represented but is rather believed to be
equipped with the right faculties to represent well.
The Anti-Federalist worried that if the ratio of representatives to represent was as small as the
constitution suggested (and eventually ratified), the natural aristocracy of the country would be the ones
governing. As Melancton Smith pointed out in a speech in June, 1788:

…I am convinced that this government is to constituted, that the representatives will
generally be composed of the first class of the community, which I shall distinguish by
the name of natural aristocracy of the country … I shall be asked what is meant by
the natural aristocracy - and told that no such distinction of classes of men exists
among us. It is true that it is our singular felicity that we have no legal or hereditary
210
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distinction of this kind; but still here are real differences. Every society naturally
divides itself into classes. The author of nature has bestowed on some greater
capacities than on others - birth, education, talents and wealth create distinctions
among men as society, men of this class will command a superior degree of respect and if the government is so constituted as to admit but a few to exercise the powers of
it, it will, according to the natural course of things, be int their hands. 213

Brutus noted:

According to the common course of human affairs, the natural aristocracy of the
country will be elected. Wealth always creates influence, and this is generally much
increased by large family connections… It is probable hat but few of the merchants,
and those of the most opulent and ambitious, will have a representation of their body
- few of them are characters sufficiently conspicuous to attract the notice of electors
of the state in so limited a representation. 214

The Anti-Federalists understood that “in the common course of human affairs” the “natural
aristocracy” of the country would be elected. Of course, as Melancton points out, this term does not
refer to a hereditary aristocracy. Rather he lists: “birth, education, talents and wealth” as the signifiers
that makes one class more aristocratic than another. Brutus reiterates this focus on class when he says,
“…wealth always creates influence, and this is generally much increased by large family connections.”
The Anti-Federalists feared that the people would not find adequate representation and subsequently
find themselves disenchanted from the government.
The consequence will be, they will have no confidence in their legislature, suspect them of
ambitious views, be jealous of every measure they adopt, and will not support the laws they
pass.” If the people do not support the laws they are governed by they will not help the
government to execute them. Brutus illustrates further: “Hence the government will be
nerveless and inefficient, and no way will be left to render it otherwise, but by establishing
an armed force to execute the laws at the point of the bayonet - - a government of all others
the most to be dreaded.215
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The sensible realization that with such a ratio the voter would feel disenchanted from the
representative, unfortunately fell through the cracks of the debate. Rather, the disagreement continued
about the characteristics of this natural aristocracy. Brutus’ dreadful narrative, could not distract from
the fact, that the Anti-Federalists did not offer a sufficient explanation of what exactly they mend by
natural aristocracy – in the sense of who exactly would fall under it – and how this natural aristocracy
would come to be elected. Certainly Brutus speaks of the “common course of human affairs” and
“large family connections,” but these notions were weak and not descriptive enough to actually discredit
the Federalist provision of the constitution.216
Referring to the inability of the Anti-Federalists to clearly define the link between elections as
proposed by the constitution and the rise of the natural aristocracy, the Federalists rather easily
retorted:
Why, then, are we told so often of an aristocracy? For my part, I hardly know the
meaning of this word, as it is applied… But who are the aristocracy among us?
Where do we find men elevated to a perpetual rank above their fellow-citizens, and
possessing powers independent of them? The arguments of the gentlemen (the AntiFederalists) only go to prove that there are men who are rich, men who are poor, some
who are wise, and others who are not; that indeed every distinguished man is an
aristocrat… This description, I presume to say is ridiculous. The image is a phantom.
Does the new government render a rich more eligible than a poor one? No. It
requires no such qualification. 217

This retort ridiculed the critique of the Anti-Federalists by forcing their argument to show that they had
not sufficiently identified what constituted a natural aristocrat and how electors would prefer such
aristocracy. As Madison wrote earlier: “…Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen
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whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country.”218 One the one hand,
there was effectively no property clause in the constitution, or any other, except for concerning age
(>25years) and state residence, that would prohibit a citizen from running for office. On the other hand
was the openness to “every citizen whose merit may recommend him” may not have been as inclusive
as, it could be understood. The Federalists welcomed the tendency of the electoral process to favor
natural aristocracy, not only on the basis of merit, but also on the basis of riches and property interests.
As Hamilton said in a speech:
Look through the rich and the poor of the community, the learned and the ignorant.
Where does virtue predominate? The difference indeed consists, not in the quantity,
but kind, of vices, which are incident to various classes; and here the advantage of
character belongs to the wealthy. Their vices are probably more favorable to the
prosperity of the state than those of the indigent, and partake less of moral
depravity. 219

In some sense the federalists welcomed the tendency of the electoral process to favor the natural
aristocracy. Among others, one reason for this preference might have been the Shays rebellion.220
Another reason might be the obvious one stated above, that the more wealthy part of the population
was considered more virtuous then the general population. As Madison states: “Large districts are
manifestly favorable to the election of persons of general respectability, and of probable attachment to
the rights of property, over competitors depending on the personal solicitations practicable on the
contracted theatre.”221 Due to the size of the country the foundational project was to encompass,
Madison thought it more likely that people of a general respectability would be chosen. A larger voting
district made it more difficult to buy voters with favors or false promises – if that is the meaning of the
218 Alexander
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‘personal solicitation’ on the ‘contracted theater’ – and so was favorable to candidates with the proper
and true attachment to property rights.222
As Manin put it, both the federalists and anti-federalists recognized the tendency of the electoral
system to favor “natural aristocracy.”223 As said before, it was unclear to some extent who would belong
to this aristocracy, and especially how it would be discerned. Whether it was talent, merit or wealth,
essentially natural aristocracy meant a certain level of superiority, which was valued even by the antifederalists. It was understood that in the “common course of human affairs” the difference between
representatives and represented would be upheld precisely by those voting, being naturally inclined to
choose the most favorable representative.
This “natural tendency” differs from any legal prerequisite for representatives. Property
qualifications were part of the debate. However, (here again) it was the size of the country and the
difference in property by region that caused the debate on a requirement to stall. According to Manin
the absence of a property clause created an elective system that in most cases would favor the natural
aristocracy, which, however, in few cases could cause voters to vote for a representative from among
themselves.224 The absence of a legal requirement like the property clause furthermore didn’t create an
incentive for the voting classes to persuade the governing classes to get rid of their legal advantage and
thus avoided conflict.225 In this sense the elective system, drawing on “natural aristocracy” informed by
the size of the land, embodied a certain flexibility that made it possible, if unlikely, for the people to
choose from amongst themselves a representative. The federalist and anti-federalists quite correctly
designed and named the elective system as an aristocratic institution, not exclusively but
overwhelmingly. An elective system that erred on the side of aristocracy and thus on the side of
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distinction among the population.
In the same way that the Anti-Federalists couldn’t clearly define how exactly the natural
aristocracy was going to gradually take over government, the Federalists could not quite discern how
they would guarantee their obvious preference of a propertied class in government. To that extend it
was their mutual intuition on the effects of elections that caused the former to worry and the later to
hope.
But was unfortunately missed during this debate was the question of agency. When Hamilton
wrote: “But who are the aristocracy among us? Where do we find men elevated to a perpetual rank
above their fellow-citizens, and possessing powers independent of them?,” it is not the aristocrats that
are to be found but the men that had political agency at the time. Namely Hamilton and all those
involved in the debate. Hannah Arendt will speak to this fact when she identifies the founding moment the moment of giving oneself a government - as the greatest moment of political freedom to act.226 She
laments subsequently that the design of the constitution did not hold any opportunity for the general
citizen to become politically active, meaning, no requisite for including townships in some way as a
necessary part of government. Instead the federal government was designed as self-sufficient (checks
and balances) and remote (Washington D.C.), making it unlikely for the general citizen to have any part
in this government. As Arendt writes:
…the age old distinction between ruler and ruled which the Revolution had set out to
abolish through the establishment of a republic has asserted itself again; once more, the
people are not admitted to the pubic realm, once ore business go government has become
the privilege of the few, who alone may ‘exercise (their) virtuous dispositions. The realist
is that the people must either sink into ‘lethargy, the forerunner of death to the public
liberty’ or ‘preserve the spirit of resistance’ to whatever government they have elected,
since the only power they remain is ‘the reserve power of revolution’.227
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Arendt's words precisely characterize the current state of politics. Transferring the freedom to act by
the method of elections, the people are left with no agency themselves and therefore will either feel
fatigue or resistance toward their government. That modern means of communication are able to
animate the masses behind certain political interests, does not change the fact, that the “excercise (of)
their virtuous dispositions,” only the few in power are able to try, for modern forms of animation rarely
come about in virtuous dispositions.
The necessary distinction between voter and representative Manin tries to identify more clearly
in the chapter of his book titled: the aristocratic character of election: a pure theory. He frames his question in
the following way:
…We shall ask here whether there are certain elements intrinsic to the elective method
with inegalitarian implications and leading to the elected being in some way superior
to the electors. This way of framing the question is in line with the tradition of
political philosophy. Aristotle, Montesquieu, and Rousseau all stated that elections
were intrinsically aristocratic. 228
This inquiry is purely theoretical. It is the attempt to rationally locate the principle of distinction in the
elective process. Were this principle not prevalent, than all citizens, beside being equal in their ability to
cast a vote for a representative, would also be equal in their ability to being chosen as a representative.
Despite Manin’s justification from above, one might object that choice will naturally always
discriminate, that there is not need to go into a purely theoretical analyses to prove the obvious. But this
misses the question, again, how exactly such choice is informed.
In order to see whether there are any intrinsic elements with inegalitarian implications in the
elective system, one has to first imagine a heuristic image of the same.229 This image displays a system in
which every individual can vote and can be voted for. There are, however, only a limited number of
representative positions available. Therefore, only a limited number of people can actually attain office.
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The voters have to make a choice between those they vote for and those they don’t. From the
perspective of the voter they have to discriminate after some principle of personal preference.230 The
preference is personal because there are no official or abstract criteria that determine choice in an
election.231 Different from a competitive examination (in maybe math or sports), the result in the
elective method depends solely on the choice of individuals, after the old absolutist motto: “Sic volo, sic
jubeo, stat pro ratione voluntas” (“Thus I wish, thus I ordain, my will takes the place of reason”).232
Likewise form the perspective of the candidate, there are no official criteria - abstractly and
announced in advance - that he may base his campaign on. Manin notes that “…candidates may try to
guess what the voters will require. But even supposing that it were possible to constitute, on the basis of
the votes, a general and abstract definition of the desired qualities, this is something that can only be
known ex post facto.”233 These considerations express the inegalitarian character of the method of
elections that is likewise its freedom. They, however, do not show how the elective process chooses
candidates that are considered superior to the one’s choosing.
Superiority comes about in the moment of choice, as Manin points out: “If candidates are
indistinguishable, voters will be indifferent, and thus unable to choose in the sense of preferring one to
another. To be chosen, therefore, a candidate must display at least one characteristic that is positively
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valued by his fellow-citizens and that the other candidates do not possess, or not to the same extent.”234
In order to be distinguishable the candidate needs to have at least one quality the other candidates do
not have. This one quality should be both positively valued and rare in the society, so that the candidate
is both positively seen and unrivaled in respect to this quality. What is rare and also positively valued in
terms of quality constitutes superiority: “…those who possess it are different and superior from those
who do not.”235 This means as Manin asserts, that “...the distinction requirement inherent in a elective
system is entirely structural.”236 The distinction, whatever it is based on, derives entirely from the
elective moment. Superiority derives thus from the structure of the method of election.
To explain this phenomenon of superiority closer Manin draws on “advantages conferred by
salience in attracting attention.”237 This term “salience” derives form cognitive psychology as describing
a quality of particularity. It has been shown, as Manin writes, that “salient stimuli elicit strong
evaluative judgments.”238 It is in line with psychological research that those candidates, who exhibit a
particular and positively valued characteristic, will be accepted by the voter, that candidates with a no
particular characteristic, will be ignored, and that candidates with a particular characteristic that is
negatively valued, will be rejected.239 Thus also on a cognitive level, elections imply superiority, if only
in as much as that superiority is constituted by saliency.240
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reasons Manin lists in how elections constitute superiority is the “cost of disseminating information,” making
the argument we hear quite often of how the dependency on money in the campaigning phase is likely to influence policy in
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That this distinctive principle informs political interests seems unlikely. Likewise, however, it also
unlikely that representatives are chosen merely for their talents or aptitude in representing certain
political interests. Rather, what is happening in the elective moment, is something like the creation of
hierarchy that finds psychological justification in saliency, not in adequate representation. Even if this
saliency does not create a distinct class of human beings that forever will be likely to govern, it does
create psychological membership to those that do not govern.
The psychological distance between those governing and those not governing therefore seems to
be informed solely on the moment of choice. Since this choice is not informed by political interests
necessarily, the legitimacy between representative and voter, is not either. Therefore consent is not given
to representation of interests, but rather to the moment of choice. Therefore the choice in elections,
holds no other political agency, then subjugation. The distance between voter and politician therefore is
also informed on a psychological level.
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Chapter IV

The distinction between those governing and those not governing is not merely a distinction
based on necessity, but also a distinction based on psychology. The distinction is informed by having the
opportunity to govern, and thus seeing oneself as a public political being, and not having any such
opportunity, and thereby see oneself merely as a private individual. Hand in hand with the distinction
between those that govern and those that do not, goes the disappointment or fatigue of the later in the
former. Obviously, the only remedy to this distinction is giving all people the opportunity to govern.
The revolution meant to spread the possibility of having a share in government, or of imagining
oneself governing, to all. But immediately after the creation of the constitution, “…the age old
distinction between ruler and ruled which the Revolution had set out to abolish through the
establishment of a republic (had) asserted itself again,”241 The reason for the reestablishment of the
distinction between representative and citizen was the failure of establishing a political body that would
give the opportunity to participate in government to all citizens. Instead, today, the constitution only
accounts for the representation of the interests and therefore only for political participation of few.
The reason not to include all may have resulted out of the wish to create a constitution that
would be last. To create a constitution that would last resulted out of the fear that continuing the
revolutionary spirit would necessarily overturn the constitution. But it was not necessarily the
revolutionary spirit — in the sense of creating a new government — that needed to continue, but
simply the opportunity of involving everyone in government. In that sense the opportunity of giving
oneself a government becomes the opportunity of acting in government.242
What made the constitutional moment exhilarating was the experience of having a share in a
beginning. This beginning was the of giving oneself government. The beautiful experience of the
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freedom of creating something good for all and that for eternity. Or in John Adams words: “to establish
a government … more agreeable to dignity of human nature, … and to transmit such government
down to their posterity with the means of securing and preserving it forever.”243 To found for all
therefore was a feeling of purpose for all. A feeling rooted in the community and for the community.244
This purpose wanted to transpire community into the future.
Because they wanted their constitution to last, the founders of had a similar image of man as
the Ancient Greeks. An image of man as fallibly that needed to be corrected.
Politically, the outstanding characteristic of the Christian era had been that this ancient
view of world and man – of mortal men moving in an everlasting or potentially
everlasting world – was reversed: men in possession of an everlasting life moved in an
ever-changing world whose ultimate fate was death; and the outstanding characteristic of
the modern age was that it turned once more to antiquity to find a precedent for its own
new preoccupation with the future of the man-made world on earth. 245
Like Aristotle the founders attempted to create a government that would make people good by
transpiring the exhilarating feeling of creating a community through the Union into the future. This
community would be ‘more agreeable to dignity of human nature’ and therefore would correct man to
live in an everlasting Union.
When the ancient Athenians had ‘no doubt what (they) meant by democracy’, as Headlam
relates, he speaks, in the widest sense, about community. The Athenians had a clear idea of what the
demos was doing in the ekklesia because they were part of it. Through sortition they had found a way to
transpire the freedom and equality associated with being part of this community also into
administrative positions of government. The citizen therefore, in Ancient Athens, found himself also in
administrative government always among peers. When Ober writes that “…the symbolic value of
ordinary citizens conducting all levels of state business must have been considerable,” he notes about
243 Arendt,
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how “…the awe that an Athenian might feel upon confronting a magistrate (…) would now be a
function of the office itself, not of the private status of the officeholder. Awe would therefore be
ascribed to the reflected grandeur of the sate, which the magistrate in some sense symbolized.”246 But
because being chosen by sortition was no different then being entrusted by the community, the awe the
citizen must have felt for the grandeur of the state also always was the awe the citizen felt for his
community. The community in Ancient Athens therefore extended in all aspects of the state and
thereby recreated itself.
The founding fathers had a similar, if not extended idea for the role of Union. The role was not
only to allow for, but also to build community. Contrary to “…those who associate genuine community
with physical intimacy, the American national government would be designed to play as large — or
larger — a role in community formation as it would in building the pyramidal structured of American
government.”247 The Union was thus not only a overarching form of government, but also, or maybe
first of all, a Union.
This Union was supposed to be ruled by “full liberty.”248 Full liberty was to be achieved by
allowing for both the liberty of the individual to be ambitious and the liberty of the individual to
deviate. The liberty of the individual to be ambitious was the liberty to fight for one’s private interests.
The liberty to deviate allowed for the creation of tolerance by hearing unique viewpoints. Together they
would create the community build under and by the Union.
Elections, however, only gave space to the liberty be ambitious. The liberty to deviate fell silent
over time. Elections only gave space to aggregate views on political interests and therefore only gave
space the liberty to be ambitious and competitive not to be tolerant. If sortition could have given space
to the liberty to deviate, the founding fathers had not thought of it, or thought it inapt.
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Sortition could, however, have created the political form for the liberty to deviate. The political
form for the liberty to deviate is a forum. The role of this forum would be similar to the original role of
the Senate as a body of appointed individuals who would debate the public good of tolerance. Their
individual voice could not define tolerance, but collegially they could.
Opinions are formed and tested in a process of exchange of opinion against opinion,
their differences can be mediated only by passing them through the medium of a body
of men, chosen for the purpose; these men, taken by themselves, are not wise, and yet
their common purpose is wisdom – wisdom under the conditions of the fallibility and
frailty of the human mind.”249
Sortition would have enabled ‘to pass opinions through the medium of a body of men’ by appointing a
collegial body of peers. In such a position the individual could speak and listen to diverse opinions and
therefore attest to the public good of tolerance. In turn, the public would witness these examples of
listen and speaking and see or experience the liberty to deviate. As such a randomly chosen, and
demographically representative body of citizen’s could debate the public good from the diverse
perspectives of the individual and unique political experience. By adding sortition the full liberty of the
Union may have been preserved.
The founding fathers had not implemented a randomly chosen body, which does not mean that
they were unaware of the limit the constitution would impose on the individuals ability to act politically.
Especially Jefferson was acutely aware that limit. He understood that he was part of a group that had
the privilege of thinking about the implications of creating government, a privilege that subsequently
could never be repeated without reforming the state.
… the reason Jefferson, throughout his long life, was carried away by such
impracticalities was that he knew, however dimly, that the Revolution, while it had
given freedom to the people, had failed to price a space where this freedom could be
exercised. Only the representatives of the people, not the people themselves, had an
opportunity to engage in those activities ‘expressing, discussing, and deciding’ which
in a positive sense are the activities of freedom.250
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The freedom to express, discuss and especially to decide - so as to give the two previous acts any weight
- would be attainable only to the few chosen for office. But since these offices related to the
representation of political interests, the opinions in these discussions would rarely relate to the plurality
of the political experience of the citizen. Rather, the opinions in elected bodies would serve the
competitive character of interest politics.

It is not only, and perhaps not even primarily, because of the overwhelming power of the
many that the voice of the few loses all strength and all plausibility under such
circumstances (the elective structure of interest politics); public opinion, by virtue if its
unanimity, provokes unanimous opposition and thus kills true opinions everywhere.251
The diversity of public opinion can not be expressed in the context of competitive interest politics,
because the whole structure aims at homogeneity instead of plurality. Public opinion can only be
expressed in a body of peers that cherish such plurality.
Hannah Arendt and Robert J. Prangers had a similar understanding of the need for such a body
of peers. Arendt identifies that both politics of interests and public opinion were part of the
constitutional design.252 Arendt also writes that the federal government was supposed to balance these
characteristics. “The power of government was supposed to control the passion of social interests and
to be controlled, in its turn, by individual reason.”253 And like Pranger Arendt sees the current
preponderance of politics of interests or ambition as a corruption of the federal government. “But in
this republic, as it presently turned out, there was no space reserved, no room left for the exercise of
precisely those qualities which had been instrumental in building it.”254 Therefore the full liberty that
Pranger identifies as a combination of the liberty of preemption and the liberty to deviate, Arendt
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terms the institution of public freedom and public happiness.255 The corruption of the federal
government took place precisely because it endowed the citizens with the power to vote, but not with
the power to try themselves as political beings in the sense of ‘expressing, discussing and deciding.’
That the corruption of the government would derive from the people itself was historically
unfamiliar.256 In the past the ruling class usually corrupted the privacy of the individual. Therefore the
remedy was sought in the creation of private property, as the space the government would have no
access to. However, with the development of an egalitarian government and the precondition of
equality for all and the limited freedom to vote, private interests become the main threat to privacy.257
As Arendt writes in contrast to the historical conception of privacy. The private realm, becoming
political through its transformation into interests, resulted in a majority driven government that was
considered legitimate in corrupting the public realm of tolerance.
Like Pranger, Arendt sees the only solution against this overbearing in the public realm itself.
258She

writes that “…the only remedies against the misuse of public power by private individuals lie in

the public realm itself, in the light which exhibits each deed enacted within its boundaries, in the very
visibility to which it exposes all those who enter it.”259 The individual being empowered not only to vote
but also to ‘express, discuss and decide’ is forced to enter the public realm and thereby forced to try
himself or herself as a public persona. Only through this motion can private interests be kept in check.
The ballot box does not allow for the opportunity to try oneself as a public persona. 260 Even
though the ballot box was not necessarily a secret institution, it was not a away of stepping into the
public realm. Instead voting was just an extension of the private space. When the Ancient Greeks had
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so much of their administration conditioned on voting in public, giving account or being held
accountable for one’s political actions, this had the effect forcing the individual constantly into the
public realm. And it was in this public realm, i.e. the ekklesia, the council, the magistrates or the courts,
that private interests were discussed. The public space therefore also always became a space in which
private interests were made public and therefore balanced by the community.
Jeffersons saw the fact of giving people the right to vote, but not a space to try themselves as
political being as the ‘mortal danger’ to the republic.261 Jefferson did not suggest sortition as a way of
allowing for the opportunity of being and acting as citizens, even thought again, this method seems to
suggest itself. What Jefferson envisioned instead was a form of involving the citizen in the political realm
by including wards. These wards, like the townships, acted as micro republics that would create the full
liberty of the general republican government. Like in Athens, community was already existent in these
townships. The advantage of including them “…would offer a better way to collect the voice of the
people than the mechanics of representative government;”262 And collecting these community voices
would at the same time create a wider sense of community and therefore an incentive for the public
good.
The wider range of participation would increase freedom both actively and passively for all. On
the side of the citizen, it would allow for the opportunity “…to make everybody feel ‘that he is a
participator in the government of affairs, not merely at an election one day in the year, but every
day;’.”263 On the side of the government to increase the sources of power was to multiply power. And
to multiply power following Montesquieu’s insight, multiplies freedom.264
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Political liberty is to be found only in moderate governments; and even in these it is not always found. It is there only
when there is no abuse of power. But constant experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it…
To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check to power. (XI, 4).
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There are two intriguing parts phrases in Arendt’s quote that relate to both sortition and
Jefferson’s and later Arendt’s design of a different representative state. Namely, the difference between
‘feeling’ that one participated in government and ‘participating in government every day’. Arendt uses
both descriptions in the same phrase. The reason is, that in the space that related the elementary
republics (wards & townships) to the general government, a pyramidal system would be implemented
that allowed for both, ‘feeling that one participated’ and ‘participating.’
In this pyramid structure each tier would collegially vote for a representative to the next higher
tear.265 The first tier was created on the ‘elementary’ level through voluntary participation. It would
allow all those to participate in government that felt themselves being called into public service. The
second tier would be made up of all those voted representative of the first tier and so on. Elections
decided who would advance to the next higher tier. Advancing was based on the trust of the voters
from the tier below. Each representative had been endowed with the trust of his voters and therefore
each tier made a body of peers. Until a group on individuals would come out on top and gain access to
the federal government and participate in government.
Within this scheme all authority was based on trust. Arguably, authority was also limited to the
space between two tiers. This system allowed for the participating of all those that wanted, in terms of
‘expressing, discussing, and deciding,’ and distributed “to every one exactly the functions (they were)
competent to do,”266 meaning the members of each tier decided whether a candidate advanced to the
next nighter tier.
In this pyramidal system community would be build on each tier. This community would first be
build by all those volunteering. But subsequently, on the higher tiers, community would be build on the
trust of the voters, because each representative had been endowed with such trust. The representative
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then again would build a body of peers and advance another individual on the basis of trust. All higher
levels, therefore were build on trust, and on all levels the individual could realize itself as political being.
It is difficult not to agree with Arendt’s conception of a different, more communal polity. She
relates a design that is purely informed by the citizen’s individual calling to politics and checked only by
trust of his or her peers, that is the members of the community on each respective tear. This trust
makes it challenging for parties to corrupt elections on the basis of some aggregate, misplaced personal
interest. This trust also makes it difficult to corrupt the individual sense of self as political being,
because this trust is reward for trustworthy political action. Each tier is a stage for the eudaimon.267
Therefore the need for trust creates a community of truly political citizens, or as Arendt relates the poet
René Char saying:
‘If I survive, I know that I shall have to break with the aroma of these essential years,
silently rejected (not repress) my treasure.’ The treasure, he thought, was that he had
‘found himself,’ that he no longer suspected himself of ‘insincerity,’ that he needed no
mask and no make-believe to appear, that wherever he went he appeared as he was to
others and to himself, that he could afford ‘to go naked’.268
A political community thus based on the trust of others upon one’s personal political calling
allows for the “full liberty” of the individual to realize itself as political being. This is not merely truly
political, but also truly beautiful.

Nevertheless, it is the point of this paper to relate sortition to the political design of such a
community. One apparent difference between Arendt’s design and sortition is that with the later the
representatives would not be chosen by the trust of their peers but by the impartial agent of chance.
Sortition, however would not relate on a pyramid scheme, whereas Arendt’s design arguably does. Even
thought authority, positively in the sense of legitimacy, is only created from one tear to another, the
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legislative ability of a higher tier would still be binding for all lower tiers and all those not involved in
any tier. Likewise community is only build on each tier, not however between the highest tier and the
general population. The voluntary aspect of the ‘elementary’ tier is also prevalent in sortition because
participation in the lottery is based on voluntarism. The representative would therefore likewise be
among his or her peers.
As has been said before sortition would offer unique and diverse testimony of the political
experience in the United States, which would give both a voice to those chosen, and the example of
listening to those among the chosen who are not speaking and to the general public who is watching.
Sortition therefore could be a way of representing opinion, next to the method of elections that
represents interests. Again following Montesquieu’s insight of the multiplication of power, this addition
is apt to realize the full liberty envisioned in the constitution. The community aspects of sortition would
be the testimonies of those speaking and listening that would give an example with the speech of the people
(as opposed to legal or interest based speech) of what it means to be a political being.
One might oppose that sortition would still only enable few. This depends on the amount of
political bodies created using sortition. One could imagine a similar multi-body system as Arendt
suggests, whilst her method could be criticized for silencing again the plurality of political experience by
congealing through gradation.269
One might oppose that sortition would not embody the plurality of the political experience, but
just the experience of those chosen. This is true and cannot be argued with. There are, however, ways
of adjusting the system of choosing toward a demographically representative simple. The number of
voices again would depend on the number of bodies chosen. Still only a number of voices would be
heard, and adjusting demographically runs into the same limits as do theories of modern polling.

Since opinions need to congeal through the pyramid structure to those that are the most trustworthy, here again, the
plurality of opinion might no necessarily find realization.
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One might oppose that even though a diverse body of citizens would be chosen, those would not
be the right citizens to create public opinion. This misunderstands the quality of both the general will
and the vision of the Senate, namely that the general will is more than its parts, and namely that the
individuals in the Senate are not wise, but rather that their common purpose is wisdom.270 There is
ample data on the sensitivity of the decision reached by randomly chosen political bodies.271 These
decisions seem further not so much based on better information, but on the deliberation among
peers.272
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Conclusion

In the end, two related questions remain. Can a demographically representative sample be
satisfactory? Can we abandon trust for the sake of abandoning a pyramid scheme of hierarchy?

These two questions are related because their outcome equally informs the trust of the public in
government, and in turn their own understanding of what it means to be part of this American
community. If demographic representation is not enough to create an identification with those speaking
and those listening, the ability of sortition to create a forum for the public good diminishes. On the
other hand, if the public does identify with the people speaking and listening and therefore start to see
themselves, and feel, as political beings, community is created. The true abandoned for the sake of
abandoning the pyramid scheme is found without such a scheme.
Sortition derived from the trust the Athenians had in their community. By having the courage to
trust each other in a system based on chance, the Athenians were able to extend the principles of
democracy, that is freedom and equality, into the administration of the state. This trust not only allowed
for the the freedom of any citizen to become a public persona but also for a constant presence of
community. But can community in turn, derive from the method of sortition? Or, in other words, can
trust derive from the method of sortition?
We do not know.
There is a reason why Arendt has to turn to poetry to find a description of what a community
based on trust feels like. We have no such community in our political world. But poetry is of the world
and therefore suggests that such community is possible. Poetry means ‘to do,’ therefore, all we can do in
finding out whether such community is possible through sortition, is trying it.273
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